IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA

JOHN WILLIAM LICCIONE,

Petitioner,

FILED
CIVIL COURT RECORDS DEPARTMENT
FEB 2 5 2025
KEN BURKE
CLERK CIRCUIT COUNTY COURT & COMPTROLLER

v.

HON. THOMAS M. RAMSBERGER and HON. PATRICIA MUSCARELLA,

Respondents.

Case No: [

Case Nos.: 2D2025-0297

L.T. No: 24-003939-CI;

L.T. No.: 24-002994-CI

EMERGENCY PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI, WRIT OF PROHIBITION, AND WRIT OF MANDAMUS

COMES NOW, Petitioner, JOHN WILLIAM LICCIONE, pro se, and respectfully petitions this Honorable Court to issue a Writ of Certiorari, Writ of Prohibition, and Writ of Mandamus to disqualify Judges Thomas Ramsberger and Patricia Muscarella, vacate their prior orders, and prohibit the contempt hearing that is being directed by Judge Ramsberger to be moved back from April 10th (a month

after Petitioner's March 11th Gulfport mayoral election) to the week of February 24th (or other date prior to the mayoral election). In support of this petition, Petitioner states as follows:

I. JURISDICTION

- 1. This Court has jurisdiction under Article V, Section 3(b)(7) of the Florida Constitution and Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.030(a)(3), which grant the Florida Supreme Court authority to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus.
- 2. The Second District Court of Appeal has denied Petitioner's prior petition for writ of prohibition, necessitating this Court's intervention to prevent manifest injustice and irreparable harm.

II. BASIS FOR PETITION

- 3. Petitioner has just discovered that 6th Circuit Court Judges Thomas
 Ramsberger and Patricia Muscarella both have personal conflicts of interest in the instant cases, as they are both necessary material witnesses, and are potentially implicated in the very election fraud allegations lying at the heart of Petitioner's claims.
- 4. This petition is based on newly discovered evidence of the two judges' conflict of interest. This new evidence was just reported to Petitioner on February

- 13, 2025, by a recent candidate for Pinellas Supervisor of Elections, Christopher Gleason who has brought his own election fraud lawsuits in, Case No. 24-003717 and Case No. 24-003995, cases based substantially on a similar set of facts and allegations.
- 5. Public records confirm that vote-by-mail (VBM) ballot requests under both Judge's names and voter ID's were recorded by the Pinellas County Supervisor of Elections' VR Systems ballot request processing system, per the Florida Division of Elections own published records, on Sunday, June 23, 2024. The judges VBM requests were among over 219,000 mail ballot requests that were recorded by the PSOE on Sunday, June 23, 2024. Of those, 97 percent which showed missing, mandatory Social Security (last 4) and/or Driver's License number entries in violation of Florida law. The State records show those fields as "N/N" in both columns instead of "Y/Y" for 97 percent of the over 219,000 VBM orders received on June 23, 2024. Judge Ramsberger and Judge Muscarella's ID fields are two of those 97 percent showing "N/N" for voter identification numbers within the State VBM request report.
- 6. As affected voters whose VBM ballot requests are in question, and as Judges who themselves could now potentially be implicated in this VBM ballot election fraud and on-going cover-up scheme, given that both have steadfastly refused to enforce the rules of discovery, and one (Judge Ramsberger) has now threatened

Petitioner with 6-months incarceration for arguing for clarification of his ambiguous Order, they cannot impartially preside over cases involving the legitimacy of the same June 23, 2024 VBM ballot request data collected from the PSOE, the State, and their elections systems contractor, VR Systems.

- 7. This data was sent to the State by the PSOE. The State created an aggregate VBM Ballot request text file covering the entire state's VBM ballot request data. Florida Division of Elections published that text file on their own web portal and made it available to active candidates for download in the August 2024 primary election as well as the general election.
- 8. Canon 3(E) of the Florida Code of Judicial Conduct requires recusal where a judge's impartiality "might reasonably be questioned." Here, the judges' participation as both adjudicators and affected parties violates judicial ethics and due process.
- 9. Attached as EXHIBITs M and N are the sworn affidavits of Christopher Gleason, a 2024 candidate for Pinellas County Supervisor of Elections. He lost his election to PSOE Julie Marcus and has brought two election fraud lawsuits alleging the same factual allegations regarding the over 219,000 VBM ballot requests recorded in Pinellas County on June 23, 2024. Judge Patricia Muscarella

¹ 24-003717-CI CHRISTOPHER GLEASON Vs. JULIE MARCUS, et Al, APPEALED PATRICIA ANN MUSCARELLA 24-003995-CI CHRISTOPHER GLEASON Vs. JULIE MARCUS, et al, APPEALED PATRICIA ANN MUSCARELLA

is presiding over both of these cases and significantly, she ordered that all his Exhibits be sealed, and she denied Mr. Gleason discovery. These are key indicators of intent to conceal her personal conflict of Interest Petitioner's and Mr. Gleason's election fraud cases. Both cases are currently under appeal in the 2nd DCA.²

- 10. Mr Gleason, as shown in the attached Exhibit M, has in his possession the State of Florida's VBM ballot request counts that the Florida Division of Elections makes available for download in their normal course of business. It is in the form of a comma-delimited text (.txt) file. As attested to in his affidavit, Mr. Gleason downloaded the official state VBM data file, and he found the June 23, 2024 VBM ballot request irregularities cited in this petition. In particular, he cites the VBM requests recorded for that day under the names and voter ID's of Judges Thomas Ramsberger and Patricia Muscarella. Their records bear the letters "N/N" in the SSAN/Driver's license fields.
- 11. Attached as EXHIBIT is the sworn affidavit of John Siamas, a 2024 candidate for Florida State Senate District 61 who lost his primary to incumbent Edward Hooper. Mr. Siamas would file his own similar election fraud lawsuit in Leon County Siamas-vs- Hooper, et al 2024-CA-001457). Like

²2D2024-2688 GLEASON V. MARCUS, ET AL

III. REQUEST TO BLOCK CONTEMPT HEARING AND VACATE ORDERS

- 10. Judge Ramsberger has improperly threatened Petitioner with up to six months of imprisonment during an active mayoral campaign (Gulfport election: March 11, 2025), violating First Amendment rights and retaliating for election fraud allegations and Petitioner's attempt to make oral argument at a January 28th telephonic hearing on his Motion for Clarification.
- 11. Judge Ramsberger signaled through his clerk on Thursday February 14th 2024 that the Judge is insisting that the contempt show cause hearing be moved way up from its currently scheduled date of April 10, 2025 (after Petitioner's Gulfport mayoral election), to February 17, 2025 (Presidents' day) or February 18th, three weeks *before* the election, further exacerbating the deliberate retaliatory harm to Petitioner. Now, just yesterday, Judge Ramsburger's assistant emailed the parties that the Judge would not hold the hearing next week, but no dates were proposed. As such, the April 10th hearing date scheduling order remains in effect.

<u>Judge Patricia Muscarella - Facts in Case 24-003939-CI</u>

12. Judge Patricia Muscarella sua sponte issued a stay order in the Clearwater case (24-003939-CI) on November 20, 2024, despite the case's direct relevance to urgent election-related proceedings.

- 13. Without any party's motion, Judges Muscarella and Ramsberger then coordinated behind the scenes to orchestrate the improper transfer of Defendant Jennifer Griffith's election fraud and election interference related counts in 24-003939-CI over to Judge Ramsberger's court in 24-002994-CI. Then, Judge Muscarella presented it as a fait accompli to Petitioner and the Defendants at a hearing on her sua sponte motion to stay proceedings (which she granted to herself) further demonstrating bias, and potential ex parte collusion.
- 14. It is noted that Case No.. 24-002994-CI was filed on July 3, 2024. It is now seven months old and to date, not a single answer to a single interrogatory, nor a single document been yet produced by any defendant, due to the judicial acts of commission and omission by Judge Ramsberger, who has even now refused to issue an order compelling discovery against any Defendant despite Petitioner having file a motion to compel discovery back in November 2024.
- 15. Finally, it is noted that Case No. 24-00393-CI was filed on September 3, 2024, is now in its sixth month and again, not a single interrogatory has been answered, nor has a single document been produced by any Defendant, due to the judicial acts of commission and omission by Judge Ramsberger.
- 16. The two Respondents' direct and personal involvement and possible implication in the VBM ballot request fraud evidence from June 23, 2024, and combined with their subsequent judicial acts to suppress discovery in these two

cases, and when one ties in Judge Muscarella's behavior in the Christopher Gleasons two cases, and Judge Ramsberger's threat of imprisonment; when taken as a whole and in a light least favorable to the two Respondents and all the reasonable inference that can be made therefrom, demonstrates an coordinated effort to violate Petitioner's right to propound discovery, to threaten bodily seizure in violation of the 4th Amendement, and to conceal evidence of their own VBM ballot requests with missing SSAN and Driver's license numbers..

17. These are serious due process violations which rise to the level of potential criminal abuse of process and intrinsic fraud, requires immediate appellate intervention by this Court, referral to the State's Attorney's Office and the FDLE, the Florida Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee, and reasonably requires the Court to direct the convening of special grand jury overseen by a Special Master and a Special Prosecutor due to Respondent's concurrently-running federal RICO election fraud lawsuit.³

³ A Special Master is necessary because Respondent has also brought a federal election fraud RICO lawsuit in the US District of the Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division, against Florida's Chief of Election Crimes and Security, Andrew Darlington, Secretary of State Cord Byrd, VR Systems CEO Mindy Perkins, Julie Marcus, Matthew Smith, and Governor Ron DeSantis (Liccione-v-DeSantis, et al – Case No. 8:24-cv-02005-SDM-NHA)

IV. LEGAL BASIS FOR RELIEF

Disqualification

- 18. Rule 2.330(d) of the Florida Rules of General Practice and Judicial Administration mandates disqualification where:
 - A judge has personal knowledge of disputed facts,
 - A judge's impartiality may reasonably be questioned, or
 - A judge is a potential witness in the proceeding.
- 19. The presence of Judges Ramsberger and Muscarella on the disputed June 23, 2024 VBM request records the State of Florida has published, records that showed no proper voter ID information evidence ("N/N") when recorded on a Sunday when the PSOE and polls were closed, makes them *at least* material witnesses, if not possible judicial co-conspirators in the alleged election fraud scheme. This requires their mandatory disqualification.
- 20. Rule 2.330(f) provides that upon a motion for disqualification, the judge must "immediately enter an order granting disqualification" if legally sufficient grounds are presented.
- 21. In *Sutton v. State*, the Florida Supreme Court emphasized that orders on petitions for writs of prohibition are reviewable by certiorari, particularly when addressing issues of judicial recusal and conflicts of interest.

- 22. The Second District Court of Appeal issued its denial of Petitioner's February 10, 2025, Petition for Writ of Prohibition on February 12, 2025, without comment. The February 10th petition did not contain this new evidence of judicial conflicts of interest because Petitioner did not receive evidence their conflicts until February 13, 2025.
- 23. Since both Judges likely knew that they had requested their VBM ballots on June 23, 2024, they both should have immediately recused themselves from these cases. The June 23, 2024, VBM ballot request spike occurred on a Sunday, a day when the Pinellas Supervisor of Elections office was closed.
- 24. This indicates the requests had to have come in over the Internet, or, via some nefarious (or even innocent) mechanism that the Pinellas County Supervisor Elections is steadfastly refusing to disclose in these two cases. Meanwhile, Judges Ramsberger and Muscarella continue to enable the cover-up by refusing to enforce the rules of discovery. This potentially implicates the Judges themselves now as judicial co-conspirators.

V. RELIEF REQUESTED

WHEREFORE, Petitioner respectfully requests this Honorable Court to:

- **A.** Treat this petition as one for writ of certiorari to review the Second District Court of Appeal's denial of Petitioner's prior petition for writ of prohibition.
- **B.** Alternatively, issue a Writ of Prohibition preventing Judge Ramsberger from proceeding with the contempt hearing against Petitioner in Case no. 24-002994-CI.
- C. Issue a Writ of Mandamus ordering Judge Muscarella to vacate her sua sponte stay order in the Clearwater case in Case No. 24-003939-CI.
- **D.** Enter an Order of Disqualification removing Judges Ramsberger and Muscarella from presiding over all related cases due to their personal conflict of interest and necessary witness status.
- E. Vacate Judge Ramsberger's December 20, 2024 Order granting in part and denying in part Defendants' Motion to Dismiss in 24-002994-CI, as it was made under improper judicial influence and bias.
- **F.** Vacate Judge Ramsberger's January 31, 2025 Order denying Petitioner's Motion for Clarification (24-002994-CI).

- G. Order the Pinellas County State's Attorney's Office to appoint a special prosecutor and to convene a special grand jury overseen by a Special Magistrate.
- **H.** Refer this matter to the Florida Department of Law Enforcement;
- I. Refer this matter to the Florida Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee.
- **J.** Grant any further relief deemed just and proper in the interest of justice.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ John W. Liccione

John W. Liccione, Petitioner, Pro Se 6800 Gulfport Blvd S., Ste 201-116 South Pasadena, FL 33707 443-698-8156 jliccione@gmail.com

Table of Exhibits: Next Page

Table of Exhibits		
Exhibit	Description	
A	Ramsberger Order Denying in Part and Granting in Part Motion to Dismiss	
В	Liccione Motion for Clarification	
С	Judge Ramsberger Order Denying Motion for Clarification, Motion for Extension to File 2nd Amended Complaint	
D	Ramsberger Motion to Dismiss Hearing Transcript - 12/13/2024.	
E	Ramsberger Motion for Clarification Hearing Transcript - 01/28/2025	
F	Ramsberger Show Cause Hearing Order (set in for 2/11/25)	
G	Ramsberger Show Cause Hearing Scheduling Order (set in for 4/10/25)	
Н	Ramsberger Judicial Assistant Emails declaring 4/10/25 Ramsberger scheduling conflict and demanding hearing reset back to week of 2/17/25.	
I	Judge Muscarella's Sua Sponte Motion/Proposed Order to Stay Proceedings	
J	Muscarella's Order Granting Court's Motion to Stay (11/20/24)	
K	Muscarella order transferring Defendant Griffith to Ramsberger's court.	
L	Affidavit of Christopher Gleason filed 10/1/24 in Case No. 24-003717-CI	
M	Sworn Statement of Christoper Gleason Dated 2/14/2025	
N	Affidavit of John Siamas dated 2/15/2025	
0	2nd DCA Order Denying Writ of Prohibition	

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been served on Respondents Judges Thomas Ramsberger and Patricia Muscarella, as well as on all Defendants, including Julie Marcus and Dustin Chase through their counsel Kirby Kreider; Jennifer Griffith, the Pinellas Democratic Executive Committee, and Michael Sherosky via their counsel George Thurlow; and Cathy Salustri Loper through her counsel James Lake, via the Florida E-Filing Portal and via email on this February 16, 2025.

/s/ John W. Liccione

EXHIBIT A

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR PINELLAS COUNTY, FLORIDA CIVIL DIVISION

JOHN WILLIAM LICCIONE, Plaintiff,

V.

PINELLAS DEMOCRATIC EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE,
MICHAEL JOHN SHEROSKY,
JENNIFER W. GRIFFITH,
Defendants.

COMPANION WITH: Case No. 24-003939-CI

Case No. 24-002994-CI

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED COMPLAINTS

THIS CAUSE, having come before the Court upon Defendants Pinellas Democratic Executive Committee, Michael John Sherosky, and Jennifer Griffith's Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint (Doc #34 in Case No. 24-002994-CI, filed November 14, 2024) and Defendant Jennifer Griffith's Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint (Doc #40 in Case No. 24-003939-CI, filed on October 2, 2024, and re-filed as part of Doc #45 in Case No. 24-002994-CI, pg. 103-115, on November 20, 2024), and this Court, having reviewed the memoranda and materials filed by counsel and Plaintiff *pro se*, and having heard arguments from Plaintiff *pro se* and counsel for Defendants, this Court hereby **ORDERS AND ADJUDGES** as follows:

Case No. 24-002994-CI: Defendants Pinellas Democratic Executive Committee, Michael John Sherosky, and Jennifer Griffith's Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint (Doc #34 in Case No. 24-002994-CI, filed November 14, 2024)

- 1. This Court **DENIES** Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on Counts I and II as they pertain to Defendant Michael Sherosky, but will require Plaintiff to re-plead Counts I and II in any amended pleading. In such an amended pleading, Plaintiff shall provide specific allegations pertaining to damages.
- 2. This Court **GRANTS** Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, without prejudice, with leave to amend, on Counts III and IV.

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- 3. This Court **GRANTS** Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on Count V pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 768.295.
- 4. This Court **GRANTS** Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on Counts VI and VII, without prejudice, with leave to amend.
- 5. This Court **GRANTS** Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on Count VIII with prejudice, as damages do not exist as an independently-pled count.

Case No. 24-003939-CI: Defendant Jennifer Griffith's Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint

6. This Court **GRANTS** Defendant's Motion to Dismiss on all counts, without prejudice, with leave to amend. If Plaintiff opts to file an Amended Complaint, the Amended Complaint must make specific allegations supporting that he has a private right of action against the Defendant with sufficient allegations.

Plaintiff shall have until December 30, 2024 to file a Second Amended Complaint, if he so desires.

Counsel for the Defendants shall file their response to the Second Amended Complaint within twenty (20) days and make every effort to schedule a hearing on any Motion(s) either pending or filed in response to a Second Amended Complaint within 45-60 days of the Second Amended Complaint being filed. Should any or all of the Defendants move to dismiss a subsequently-filed Second Amended Complaint, the meet-and-confer requirement for such a Motion is waived.

[THIS SPACE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK]

Nothing in this Order shall be construed as an adjudication of Defendants' legal or factual defenses, including the applicability of Fla. Stat. § 768.295, except as otherwise provided and Defendants' are permitted to raise these issues for adjudication by the Court in subsequent Motions.

Entered in Chambers, St. Petersburg, Pinellas County, Florida on this and day of

CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE

Copies to:

-John William Liccione, Plaintiff Pro Se

-George A.D. Thurlow, Esquire, Counsel for Defendants



IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR PINELLAS COUNTY, FLORIDA

JOHN WILLIAM LICCIONE,	
Plaintiff,	
v.	Case No.: 24-002994-CI
PINELLAS DEMOCRATIC	
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, et al.,	
Defendants.	
/	

MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION

Plaintiff, John William Liccione, pro se, respectfully requests clarification of the Court's bench order and subsequent written order, which denied in part and granted in part Defendants' motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint. Plaintiff seeks clarification to resolve ambiguities and inconsistencies that prejudice his ability to proceed with this case and meet Court-ordered deadlines. Specifically, Plaintiff requests that the Court clarify that while Defendants may raise the anti-SLAPP defense in a motion for summary judgment after discovery, assuming no material facts remain in dispute, they are barred from re-litigating the anti-SLAPP defense in a motion to dismiss under the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Plaintiff also seeks confirmation that, now that the Court has effectively ruled the anti-SLAPP statute does not apply to Counts I and II (battery and assault), Plaintiff is entitled to attorney's fees and costs if he prevails in this lawsuit, and that Defendant PDEC may be held liabile for the wrongful acts of Defendant Sherosky when acting in his capacity as Secretary of PDEC. In support of this motion, Plaintiff states as follows:

I. CURRENT CASE POSTURE

1. During the December 13, 2024, hearing on Defendants' motion to dismiss, this Court issued rulings from the bench as follows:

Rulings on Motion to Dismiss in Case No. 24-002994-CI

- Count I (Battery): DENIED.
- Count II (Assault): DENIED.
- Count III (Vicarious Liability): GRANTED, without prejudice, with leave to amend.
- Count IV (Conspiracy): GRANTED, without prejudice, with leave to amend.
- Count V (Violation of Election Laws): GRANTED, with prejudice.
- Count VI (Violation of Civil Rights): GRANTED, without prejudice, with leave to amend.
- Count VII (Defamation): GRANTED, without prejudice, with leave to amend.
- Count VIII (Damages): GRANTED, with leave to amend, with instructions to incorporate damages pleadings into each count.

Rulings on Counts from Merged Case No. 24-002994-CI Pertaining to Defendant Griffith

- Count I (Violation of Fla. Stat. § 1104.041 Fraud in Connection With Elections): GRANTED, without prejudice, with leave to amend.
- Count II (Conspiracy to Commit Election Fraud): GRANTED, without prejudice, with leave to amend.

- Count III (Violation of 52 U.S.C. § 120511 Federal Election Fraud):
 GRANTED, without prejudice, with leave to amend.
- Count IV (Civil Rights Violations under 18 U.S.C. § 11030): GRANTED,
 without prejudice, with leave to amend.
- Count V (Computer Fraud and Abuse Act Violation under 18 U.S.C. § 1030):
 GRANTED, without prejudice, with leave to amend.
- Count VI (Intentional Interference With Prospective Economic Advantage):

 GRANTED, without prejudice, with leave to amend.
- Count VII (Voter Intimidation and Voter Suppression, Civil Rights
 Violations under Florida Section 104.0615, 104.061, the federal Voting
 Rights Act of 1965, the Civil Rights Act of 1957, and Title 18, Section 594):
 GRANTED, without prejudice, with leave to amend.
- Count VIII (Request for Injunctive Relief): GRANTED, without prejudice,
 with leave to amend.
- Count IX: Not applicable to these Defendants and thus not merged into this case.
- Count X (Damages): DENIED, with instructions to incorporate damages pleadings into each count.
- 2. At the conclusion of the hearing, Defendants' counsel, George Thurlow, requested clarification on whether Defendants' defenses raised in the motion to dismiss could be repleaded in response to Plaintiff's anticipated Second Amended Complaint.
- 3. The Court's written order, entered on December 20, 2024, contained the following language, some of which Plaintiff objected to during his meet and confer conference on the Order with Defendant's Counsel George Thurlow:

- "This Court DENIES Defendant's Motion to Dismiss on Counts I and II as they
 pertain to Defendant Michael Sherosky, but will require Plaintiff to re-plead
 Counts I and II in any amended pleading. In such an amended pleading, Plaintiff
 shall provide specific allegations pertaining to damages."
- "Nothing in this Order shall be construed as an adjudication of Defendants' legal or factual defenses, *including the applicability of Fla. Stat. § 768.295*, except as otherwise provided, and Defendants are permitted to raise these issues for adjudication by the Court in subsequent Motions." (emphasis added)

Additionally, Plaintiff notes that Defendant Sherosky is being sued in both his official capacity as (now former) Secretary of the Pinellas Democratic Executive Committee (PDEC) and in his personal capacity. Therefore, the denial of the motion to dismiss on Counts I and II applies not only to Defendant Sherosky's liability, but also to Defendant PDEC's.

4. This language creates ambiguity and confusion as to whether Defendants may reassert their anti-SLAPP defense in a motion to dismiss, and under what circumstances, despite the Court's prior ruling denying dismissal of Counts I and II, and ambiguity about which of the three Defendants can be held liable under Counts I and II.

II. PREJUDICE TO PLAINTIFF

5. Plaintiff must decide by December 30, 2024, whether to file a Second Amended

Complaint or whether to proceed solely on Counts I and II, by Court-ordered filing

deadline. The ambiguities and omissions in the Court's order prejudices Plaintiff's

ability to make this decision, as it is unclear whether Defendants may re-litigate the anti
SLAPP defense in a motion to dismiss, and which Defendants are liable.

- 6. The Court's written order appears to reverse its bench ruling, which categorically denied Defendants' motion to dismiss Counts I and II. This reversal undermines the finality of the Court's initial ruling and creates uncertainty regarding the applicability of the anti-SLAPP statute.
- 7. Furthermore, now that the Court has effectively ruled that the anti-SLAPP statute does not apply to Counts I and II, Plaintiff is entitled to attorney's fees and costs if he prevails in this lawsuit under Fla. Stat. § 768.295(4): A *prevailing party* in an action where the anti-SLAPP statute is invoked is entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred. Plaintiff requests confirmation that this entitlement applies to him as the prevailing party on the anti-SLAPP issue for Counts I and II.

III. MEMORANDUM OF LAW

- 8. The Court has already expeditiously denied the Defendant's prior motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint, which was predicated on the anti-SLAPP statute and other grounds. This denial constitutes a determination that the Defendant failed to meet the statutory burden required to invoke the protections of the anti-SLAPP statute at this stage of the proceedings.
- 9. Allowing the Defendant to re-litigate the anti-SLAPP defense in a subsequent motion to dismiss undermines the letter and spirit of the anti-SLAPP statute, which was enacted to ensure the prompt resolution of such defenses at the outset of litigation. The statute's purpose is to prevent the chilling effect of meritless lawsuits and to protect parties from the undue burden and expense of prolonged litigation.
- 10. The anti-SLAPP statute provides a procedural mechanism for the early dismissal of claims that improperly target constitutionally protected activities. Courts have

- consistently recognized that the statute's protections are significantly eroded if defendants (and plaintiffs too) are forced to repeatedly litigate the same issues, as this perpetuates the very type of harm the statute seeks to prevent.
- 11. The doctrine of collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) further supports barring the Defendant from re-litigating the anti-SLAPP defense in a subsequent motion to dismiss. Under Florida law, collateral estoppel applies when: (1) the parties or their privies are the same; (2) the issue is identical to one previously litigated; and (3) the issue was fully litigated and decided by a court of competent jurisdiction. These elements are satisfied here, as the Court has already ruled on the inapplicability of the anti-SLAPP statute in the prior motion to dismiss under Counts I and II.
- 12. The legislative intent behind the anti-SLAPP statute, as well as its procedural framework, underscores the necessity of resolving anti-SLAPP defenses swiftly and definitively. Allowing the Defendant to reassert the same defense in a piecemeal fashion contravenes this intent and imposes unnecessary delays and costs on the Plaintiff, contrary to the statute's purpose.
- 13. Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Honorable Court clarify that the Defendant is precluded from re-litigating the anti-SLAPP defense in a subsequent motion to dismiss and that any further assertion of this defense must be raised, if at all, in a motion for summary judgment after all material facts are no longer in dispute.
- 14. Anti-SLAPP Statute Has Been Found to Not Apply to Counts I and II:

Florida's anti-SLAPP statute, codified in Fla. Stat. § 768.295, protects against meritless lawsuits aimed at chilling constitutional rights. However, claims of battery and assault as pleaded here, as already effectively found by this Court, are *not* acts of public

participation protected under the statute. By denying Defendants' motion to dismiss Counts I and II, the Court has already determined that the anti-SLAPP statute does not apply to these claims...and by extension... to all other claims dismissed without prejudice.

15. Collateral Estoppel (Issue Preclusion):

The doctrine of collateral estoppel bars Defendants from re-litigating the anti-SLAPP defense in a motion to dismiss. The Court's denial of the motion to dismiss on Counts I and II constitutes a substantive determination that the anti-SLAPP defense is inapplicable to this lawsuit in its entirety because the Court has found this lawsuit to be *meritorious* enough to have already survived a motion to dismiss on anti-SLAPP and all other grounds pleaded by Defendants. Allowing Defendants to reassert this defense, at all, in a subsequent motion to dismiss would violate principles of judicial economy, finality, and collateral estoppel (issue preclusion).

16. Anti-SLAPP Defense in Summary Judgment:

Defendants may raise the anti-SLAPP defense in a motion for summary judgment after discovery, provided no material facts remain in dispute. This approach aligns with the purpose of the anti-SLAPP statute, which is to resolve meritless claims expeditiously (and by inference also allowing *meritorious* claims to proceed expeditiously), while preserving the right to litigate legitimate disputes.

17. Entitlement to Attorney's Fees and Costs:

Under Fla. Stat. § 768.295(4), a *prevailing party* in an action involving the anti-SLAPP statute is entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees and costs. Now that the Court has

ruled the anti-SLAPP statute does not apply to Counts I and II (battery and assault) Plaintiff is entitled to recover his fees and costs if he prevails in this lawsuit.

IV. RELIEF REQUESTED

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court clarify its order and definitively find that:

- A. Battery and assault are not protected acts of public participation eligible for protection under Fla. Stat. § 768.295.
- B. Plaintiff has already pleaded sufficient facts and allegations of battery and assault and damages in Counts I and II in his First Amended Complaint sufficient for the Court to reaffirm its denial of the Motion to Dismiss on Counts I and II.
- C. Defendants are barred under the doctrine of collateral estoppel from re-litigating the anti-SLAPP defense in a motion to dismiss.
- D. The Motion to Dismiss is denied on Counts I and II as to Defendants Michael Sherosky in both his capacity as Secretary of Defendant PDEC, and in his personal capacity, and that PDEC may be held liable for Sherosky's tortious acts as alleged under Counts I and II;
- E. Plaintiff, if he prevails in this lawsuit, is entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees and costs under Fla. Stat. § 768.295(4).

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ John W. Liccione John W Liccione, Plaintiff, pro se 6800 Gulfport Blvd S. Ste 201-116 South Pasadena, FL 33707 443-698-8156 Jliccione@gmail.com

CERTIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH MEET AND CONFER ORDER

Pursuant to the applicable rules and administrative orders of the Sixth Judicial Circuit, I hereby certify that I and Defendants' counsel George Thurlow made a good faith effort to meet and confer on this motion and did in fact meet and confer on this day. We were unable to come to any agreement on this motion.

/s/ John W. Liccione

CERTIFICATION OF SERVICE

I, John William Liccione, Plaintiff, on this 21st day of December 2024, hereby certify that the forgoing Plaintiff's Motion for Clarification was e-served on all defendants through their attorney George Thurlow via the Court's e-file and e-serve system and via email.

/s/ John W. Liccione



IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR PINELLAS COUNTY, FLORIDA CIVIL DIVISION

JOHN WILLIAM LICCIONE, Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 24-002994-CI

PINELLAS DEMOCRATIC EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, MICHAEL JOHN SHEROSKY, JENNIFER W. GRIFFITH, Defendants.

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION AND MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

THIS CAUSE, having come before the Court at a telephonic hearing on January 28, 2025 upon Plaintiff's Motion for Clarification (Doc # 64, filed December 21, 2024) and Plaintiff's Motion for Extension of Time of Filing Deadline for Second Amended Complaint (Doc # 65, filed December 30, 2024), and the Court, having reviewed Plaintiff's Motions and heard Plaintiff's oral argument, and being otherwise fully and duly advised in its premises, hereby **ORDERS AND ADJUDGES** as follows:

- 1. Plaintiff's Motion for Clarification (Doc # 64, filed December 21, 2024) is **DENIED**. The Court finds that the Order on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss entered on December 20, 2024 (Doc # 62) speaks for itself, and is sufficiently clear.
- 2. Plaintiff's Motion for Extension of Time of Filing Deadline for Second Amended Complaint (Doc # 65, filed December 30, 2024) is **DENIED**. The Court notes that as the Order on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss provided for a deadline of December 30, 2024 to file a Second Amended Complaint, and Plaintiff has still not filed such, Plaintiff has already received an extension of nearly a month in filing such. If Plaintiff desires to file a Second Amended Complaint, it must be filed by February 4, 2025 at 4:00pm local time.

Ordered in Chambers, St. Petersburg, Pinellas County, Florida on this _____ day of January,

24-002994-Cl 1/31/2025 2:55:45 PM Circuit Judge Thomas Ramsberger 24-002994-Cl 1/31/2025 12:55:45 PM

The Honorable Thomas M. Ramsberger

The Honorable Thomas M. Ramsberger Circuit Court Judge

Copies to: John William Liccione (Plaintiff *Pro Se*) and George A.D. Thurlow, Esq.

EXHIBIT D

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- 1 IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
- 2 IN AND FOR PINELLAS COUNTY, FLORIDA

ORIGINAL

- 3 CIVIL DIVISION
- 4 CASE NO. 24-002994-CI
- 5 CASE NO. 24-003939-CI

6

- 7 JOHN WILLIAM LICCIONE,
- 8 Plaintiff

9

10 V.

11

- 12 PINELLAS DEMOCRATIC EXECUTIVE COMPANION WITH:
- 13 COMMITTEE,
- 14 MICHAEL JOHN SHEROSKY,
- 15 JENNIFER W. GRIFFITH,
- 16 Defendants

17

18 HEARING

19

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- 22 DATE: DECEMBER 13, 2024
- 23 REPORTER: VANESSA MCCORMICK

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10
11
   ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANT, PINELLAS DEMOCRATIC
12
   EXECUTIVE COMPANION WITH: COMMITTEE, MICHAEL JOHN
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   SHEROSKY, JENNIFER W. GRIFFITH:
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   Also Present: Thomas Ramsberger, Judge
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1 STIPULATION 2 The hearing was taken at MILESTONE REPORTING COMPANY, 3 315 EAST ROBNINSON STREET, SUITE 510, ORLANDO, FLORIDA 32801, via teleconference in which all participants 5 attended remotely, on FRIDAY the 13th day of DECEMBER 6 7 2024 at 10:31 p.m. (ET); said hearing was taken pursuant to the FLORIDA Rules of Civil Procedure. 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25



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PROCEEDINGS 1 2 THE COURT: Good morning. This is Judge 3 Ramsberger for case number 24-2994. Do we have the plaintiff on? 4 5 MR. LICCIONE: Yes, sir. This is John Liccione. 6 7 THE COURT: All right. And you're still 8 representing yourself? You're pro se, correct? 9 MR. LICCIONE: Yes, sir. THE COURT: The three defendants that I have 10 11 listed here are the Pinellas Democratic Executive 12 Committee, Michael Sherosky, and Jennifer Griffith. 13 Do we have counsel for those three defendants? 14 MR. THURLOW: Yes. George Thurlow, Your Honor, 15 on behalf of all three defendants. 16 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. And for the 17 plaintiff: originally, I believe the Democratic --18 for the Democratic Party was part of the lawsuit. 19 It looks like they're not part of it. Did you 20 withdraw your -- did you dismiss them from the 21 Complaint? 22 MR. LICCIONE: Yes, sir, I had. I did that. 23 THE COURT: Okay. And do we have a court 24 reporter today? 25 THE REPORTER: Yes, Your Honor. Vanessa



McCormick, court reporter with Milestone Reporting 1 2 Company. THE COURT: All right. Good morning, Vanessa. 3 4 And is there anybody else on the call that we 5 haven't identified yet? 6 MR. LICCIONE: Your Honor, this is Mark 7 I'm counsel for a Democratic Party, and 8 I'm just an interested listener. 9 THE COURT: Very good. Good morning to you. 10 And is there anybody else on the call today? 11 All right. Counsels, we were -- folks, we were 12 here on November 21. We've -- we accomplished a 13 couple of things on that date. One thing that we 14 did not accomplish is addressing the defendants' 15 Motion to Dismiss. And I believe that Motion to 16 Dismiss, Mr. Thurlow, was filed on August 12 on 17 behalf of the three defendants; is that accurate? 18 MR. THURLOW: That is correct. That was a 19 Motion to Dismiss the original Complaint. Plaintiff 20 subsequently filed an Amended Complaint in early 21 November, so we filed a very similar Motion to 22 Dismiss Amended Complaint on November 14th. 23 THE COURT: Okay. So it is your position, 24 Defense, that the operative complaint is the Amended 25 Complaint that is filed on --

MR. THURLOW: Yeah. 1 2 THE COURT: -- November 7th? 3 MR. THURLOW: Yes, Your Honor. 4 THE COURT: Okay. And for the plaintiff, 5 that's your understanding; is your operative 6 complaint, meaning the complaint that's the one to 7 be challenged today, is the one that is filed on November 7 of 2024? 8 9 MR. LICCIONE: No, Your Honor. Yesterday, I filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's 10 denial of my previous Motion for Leave to file a 11 12 Second Amended Complaint, so that motion, I believe, 13 is before the Court. Your assistant said she had 14 forwarded that to you today, so I would state that 15 that is -- a determination on that Motion for 16 Reconsideration is necessary because I obviously --17 I've -- my position is that the Second Amended 18 Complaint, as was attached to this Motion for 19 Reconsideration, a draft of, you know -- a proposed 20 Second Amended Complaint is in the Court's 21 possession. 22 THE COURT: Counsel? All right. The operative 23 complaint today for the purposes of this hearing is 24 the one filed by Plaintiff on November 7 of 2024.



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If you filed a Motion for Reconsideration, the Court

doesn't know if that's been noticed for hearing or
not today.

Mr. Thurlow, is it your understanding that

that motion has been noticed for hearing today?

MR. THURLOW: The notice of hearing says that there is a case management conference where all pending motions to be addressed. I believe that motion was filed yesterday and has not been docketed, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Do you oppose, Mr. Thurlow, hearing the Motion to Reconsider?

MR. THURLOW: I do, because I believe it's -the amendment would futile and prejudicial since my
client filed a Motion to Dismiss under Florida's
anti-SLAPP statute, which requires hearing as soon
as practicable. And this is our third attempt at
trying to have a hearing on our Motion to Dismiss.

THE COURT: Okay. For the plaintiff, I won't consider your Motion for Reconsideration today because it wasn't timely noticed for hearing under our rules of procedure. You are welcome to set that for hearing in the future if you'd like to. We're going to go forward with the defendants' Motion to Dismiss, and that's relative to the Complaint -- the Amended Complaint filed November 7 of 2024.



Mr. Thurlow, was there any other motions that you've set for hearing today?

MR. THURLOW: There's also a Motion to Dismiss.

As you may recall, the Court consolidated claims from another case filed by the plaintiff as it pertains to defendant Griffith. And we also filed a Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint on that case.

And there is a lot of overlapping legal issues to those. So I'm happy to address both of those motions together because of the law, and our arguments are going to be extremely similar on both.

THE COURT: Okay. And effectively, what's gone on, just so we're clear and the record's clear, is that in a lawsuit that the plaintiff filed in Clearwater, that lawsuit included other defendants, but it also included Jennifer Griffith. And via a hearing with Judge Muscarella, and a conversation with Judge Muscarella and myself, Judge Muscarella entered an order that effectively consolidated Jennifer Griffith as a defendant in the Clearwater case to a defendant here in what we'll call the —— if you all could pick up your microphone. I'm getting a lot of paper shuffling. If you could please remove yourself from microphones and just use held or handsets, please.

What happened then was, any claims that were 1 2 made against Jennifer Griffith in the Clearwater 3 case have now been consolidated into the St. 4 Petersburg case. And what I mean by St. Petersburg 5 case is case 242994. So to be abundantly clear, Mr. 6 Thurlow, any claims that were made against Jennifer 7 Griffith in the Clearwater case, which is now 8 consolidated with this case, you would like to 9 address that in that Motion to Dismiss today? 10 MR. THURLOW: Correct, Your Honor. 11 THE COURT: And you'd like to do that as a 12 combined Motion to Dismiss and address it as one 13 argument, correct? 14 MR. THURLOW: Yes, Your Honor. 15 THE COURT: Okay. So is there any other 16 pending motion that was noticed for today for the 17 defendant? 18 MR. THURLOW: Just the case management --. 19 the time the notice of hearing was filed, there 20 were, I believe, four other pending motions. 21 Plaintiff filed a Motion to Strike my appearance on 22 November 18th. And then in the Clearwater case 23 before it was consolidated, my client, Ms. Griffith, 24 filed a Motion for Sanctions, and the plaintiff



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filed a Motion to Compel Discovery, and a Motion to

Shorten Time to Respond to Discovery. 1 2 THE COURT: Okay. And then other than that, 3 for Plaintiff, is there anything else that was 4 noticed for hearing today? 5 MR. LICCIONE: I think that covers it, Your 6 Honor. 7 THE COURT: Okay. On a time-permitted basis, 8 I'll address as many of those motions as we can. 9 Before we run out of time today, I want to make 10 certain that we address the Motion to Dismiss, which 11 will be, basically, a combined motion. It will be 12 the motion filed on August 12 of 2024, along with the Motion to Dismiss filed in case number 243939. 13 14 Again, that's the Clearwater case. And to be 15 abundantly clear, that motion only addresses any causes of action that were alleged against Jennifer 16 17 Griffith in that action. And then we will have a 18 case management conference to make sure we 19 understand what is going to happen going forward. 20 With regard to your motion, Mr. Thurlow, the 21 motion that you filed in case 243939, did you happen 22 to refile it in this case? 23 MR. THURLOW: I'm not sure I did, Your Honor. 24 THE COURT: Okay. 25 MR. THURLOW: I believe we actually did.



filed a notice of filing a binder before the last hearing, and it was -- part of that binder we filed with the Court. Would a docket number be helpful for you?

THE COURT: Yes, please.

MR. THURLOW: Give me one moment. I'm just going to pull that up. I believe it would be docket number 45 in this instant case, Your Honor. And that is a long document, so I'll tell you what page number it is in just a second. It will be starting at page 102 of that -- or 103 in the PDF, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Give me a moment to locate that. Okay, I have that motion in front of me. And also, let me do this. I want to make sure that I've got the correct complaint in front of me. I originally pulled up the first complaint, which, again, has now been amended. So we're working off the Amended Complaint filed November 7 of 2024. Okay.

And again, Mr. Thurlow, as you begin to make your argument, your motion relates to all three defendants, and what's now going to be included with that is your additional Motion to Dismiss on behalf of Ms. Griffith, correct?

MR. THURLOW: Correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Go ahead and make your argument, and then we'll hear a response from Plaintiff.

MR. THURLOW: All right. Thank you, Your Honor. We're here on defendants Pinellas County Democratic Executive Committee, Jennifer Griffith, and Michael Sherosky's Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint in case number 24-002994-CI, as well as defendant Jennifer Griffith's Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint in case number 24-003939-CI. Given the high amount of similarity in these motions, we're going to address them together.

And you see in both lawsuits is what are known as strategic lawsuits against public participation, which are prohibited under Florida Statute Section 768.295. The plaintiff was a candidate for -- in the Democratic Primary for Florida's 13th Congressional District, the seat currently held by Congresswoman Anna Paulina Luna, and is now a candidate for mayor of Gulfport. And the defendants are respectively -- the county-level Democratic Party in Pinellas County is now former chair, Jennifer Griffith, and is now former secretary, Michael Sherosky. At the time the case was filed,

Ms. Griffith was chair, and Mr. Sherosky was secretary of the party.

And what Florida's anti-SLAPP statute does, is it prohibits lawsuits that are primarily filed against defendants for exercising First Amendment rights in connection to an issue of public importance. A primary election for United States Congress, which had over 50,000 votes in our county, is clearly an issue of public importance. What occurred is that the county- level Democratic Primary and its then chair and secretary opted not to provide the plaintiff a platform for his candidacy and prohibited from letting him attend their event --

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MR. THURLOW: -- the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendants' activity was in fact actionable, and that these claims are not primarily based upon the defendants'

exercise of their first amendment right. In spite of aspersions to the contrary, the Democratic Party is a private organization, and neither the DEC nor its officers are state actors.

The Democratic Party at the county or state level plays no role in counting votes. In our binder of court filings and case law, we provided a couple of analogous cases, which I'll address later on: Kissinger v. Mahoning County Republican Party, and Emmanuelle (phonetic) v. -- which clarifies that the burden to place a political party as a state actor is very steep, even when that political party is working hand-in-hand with election officials in their non-public capacities to achieve mutual political goals, which is not the case here. Plaintiff has failed to meet that very high burden.

The gist of this is that political parties have the right to identify people they wish to associate with. And according to the U.S. Supreme Court case of Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee, political parties select a standard-bearer who "best represents the party's ideologies and preferences."

The U.S. Supreme Court concluded that a judicial restriction of a political party's



governing body from conceding whether a candidate adheres to the tenets of that party or whether politic party officials believes that the candidate is qualified for the position sought is an unconstitutional restriction on free speech. That is because it directly hampered the ability of the party to spread its message and voters seeking to inform themselves about the candidates and campaign issues. The court even went as far as to say the restrictions are particularly egregious when it is a state-censoring speech that a political party shares for its' members.

What the plaintiff is seeking for this Court to do is to penalize a political party to the form of censorship for not sharing Plaintiff's speech with its members. In fact, I have stated in Exhibit 1 of Plaintiff's filings, that was filed earlier this week, the plaintiff wants an endorsement for his candidacy of mayor of Gulfport in a potential settlement. This is clearly political --

MR. LICCIONE: Objection, Your Honor.

Objection, Your Honor. Settlement discussions are not appropriate in a motions' to dismiss hearing.

THE COURT: Who's making that objection? Mr. Liccione?



MR. LICCIONE: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Okay. I'll sustain the objection.

I won't consider settlement. Go ahead, mister -
Mr. Thurlow.

MR. THURLOW: Okay, yes. And in case number — this instant case, the plaintiff has brought a defamation count against all three defendants, but has only pled it against Ms. Griffith, alleging she was acting in her official capacity as chair. And since Plaintiff, as a political candidate is a public figure, he must meet an actual malice threshold.

The actual malice threshold requires that a public figure plaintiff must prove, one, publication by the defendant. Two, a false statement. Three, acknowledge reckless disregard to falsity. Four, actual damage. And five, that the statement is, in fact, defamatory. And Plaintiff seems to be centered on an -- on a statement that Ms. Griffith made in the Tampa Bay Times saying that the plaintiff is a man of "moral turpitude."

Ultimately such a statement is protected, it's opinion speech. It is not discernibly true or false. What moral turpitude even means is a context-dependent statement. It means different things than

say, criminal court versus an employment contract.

Saying someone is unfit to be a democratic candidate, which is another one of the allegations, is also a statement of opinion. And even if these statements cross into factual statements, they still do not meet the actual malice threshold. But this still really boils down to the decision to not provide Plaintiff a platform, not invite him to a debate. And these comments made about Plaintiff were all First Amendment speech in relation to a public issue. And my client seeks dismissal under the anti-SLAPP statute. The burden now falls to the Plaintiff to demonstrate that this state -- these statements were actionable and we don't believe he'll be able to do that.

And this past week, in the case of Flynn v. Wilson, the Second DCA case, 2D-2024-0 278, the Second DCA entered an opinion affirming an Anti-SLAPP motion for summary judgment in that case. And basically, they focused on whether the defendants had serious doubts to the truthfulness, which my client -- there's no evidence alleged that my client's ever had serious doubts to the truthfulness.

And the last paragraph of that opinion, I think



really delivers the gist of the issue. And that paragraph is, "We have the privilege of living in a country with a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited robust and wide open. And that it may well include --, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp," Sullivan, 376 U.S. 270. And then like it or not, such attacks are characteristic feature of our democracy, regardless of the political persuasion of the speaker and regardless of the political persuasion of the public figure on the receiving end of that speech. As the trial court noted, the defendants' tweets may not have been polite and they may not have been fair, but the First Amendment required neither. And so we affirm.

Then turning to the case of Kissinger v.

Mahoning County Republican Party, which is 677 Fed.

Supp. 3d 716. It's a 2023 case from the Northern

District of Ohio that's really highly analogous to

this instant case. In Kissinger, the plaintiffs

attempted to deliver materials to a local Republican

Party headquarters for candidates who are not

endorsed by former President Trump at a time when JD

Vance, who was then running for U.S. Senate in

Ohio, was at the party's headquarters campaigning

and the Republican Party said they were not allowed to deliver materials for JD Vance's opponents at that time.

The plaintiff proceeded to stand outside party headquarters protesting, and they alleged an individual assaulted them by taking a campaign sign and throwing Plaintiff to the ground. And this specific incident was a culmination of an ongoing feud. And in Kissinger, the court ultimately held that the local Republican Party and the individuals associated with it, including those who actually serve on a county elections board, were not state actors and that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear such claims, for simply non-justiciable issues.

And the facts of Kissinger are highly similar to this case, where a local Democratic Party informed the plaintiff he was not welcome at their events and they would not provide a platform for their candidacy. Plaintiff then alleges a physical altercation with a party, or official of the party, which my client disputes. But regardless of the factual veracity of that allegation, the end result is that my client were not state actors, had a right to engage in political speech about Plaintiff's

candidacy, that this Court does not have jurisdiction over the claims involving a political party.

Dismissal under Florida's anti-SLAPP statute is with prejudice and defendants would be entitled to the award of reasonable attorney fees and costs under the statute. However, even if this court were to decide that anti-SLAPP did not apply, dismissal still would not be appropriate because of this lack of subject matter jurisdiction. And that there's a clear failure to state a cause of action upon which release may be granted.

In this instant case Counts number I and II are tort claims against Mr. Sherosky. While this Court does have jurisdiction over tort claims, neither is sufficiently pled. For Count number I, the Complaint -- the Amended Complaint is entirely contradictory as to whether Mr. Sherosky ever touched the plaintiff. In fact, paragraph 36 alleges that Mr. Sherosky "came within 5 inches of Plaintiff's face." Coming within 5 inches of someone seems to infer that there was not any touching and actually touching someone is an element of battery. And even if Mr. Sherosky touched the plaintiff, the contact, the hat falling off, was not

harmful or offensive as far as the law could see, therefore the count failed.

The same thing can be said of Count II. It failed to allege the required elements of battery. Count III, which is a claim for vicarious liability against the Pinellas Democratic Executive Committee and Ms. Griffith, fails to state the claim for vicarious liability. There's a Count IV, the claim for civil conspiracy. It is not properly pled. Counts V and VI are non-justiciable issues. There is no private rights of action under the statute cited by Plaintiff. And Count VII is not properly pled. Therefore, I mean, these counts should all be dismissed.

Then turning to the allegations in the companion case, 24-003939-DI, Counts I, III, IV, and VI. The statute cited by the plaintiff do not provide for private rights of action. Therefore, the plaintiff doesn't have standing to bring these counts. And then for Counts V and VI, whether it might be private rights of action, the plaintiff has failed to seize the required elements. So we ask for dismissal of that Complaint as well. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Plaintiff, your response to the



motions to dismiss, plural, as in both of them together. Go ahead, please.

MR. LICCIONE: Yes, Your Honor. First, I want to point out that in the second case, that's been combined as to Jennifer Griffith. In that case in Clearwater, there's — there are additional factual allegations of events that occurred after this case was filed and those — and counts. And that's particularly the count of election fraud, mail ballot fraud, on the part of Griffith and the Democratic Party. All right, so I just want to point out that that's an additional count that's now combined here.

So first of all, I'd like to address the anti-SLAPP argument. I'll start off by saying that anti-SLAPP protections are not absolute. The defendants are incorrectly arguing that their behavior and their statements and their actions are all immune under the anti-SLAPP statute. The statute actually only applies to speech made in connection with a public issue or issue of public concern.

So for example, calling me an ass in public, that's protected speech because that's an opinion.

In this case, Defendant's defamatory statements were not expressions of opinion, but were very specific,



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false factual assertions, easily disproven by court records, showing I was found not guilty of assaulting my wife in Maryland. So false factual assertions that can be easily verified as false and that they knew were false because there was a court record, a not guilty verdict sheet, from that trial that I was found not guilty of all counts. And they knew it, that -- it was true because I told them and I offered to provide Jennifer Griffith a copy of the not guilty verdict sheet, and she ignored it, or she realized it was untrue, but she said it anyway. And that's sort of the definition. That is the definition of reckless disregard for the truth.

So the argument that these were just political opinions? Yeah, you can call me an ass in public.

Sure. But I'm not suing because Michael Sherosky called me an ass, and he did and admitted to it on camera, once I took my cell phone out. I'm suing him for assault -- for battery to start with, because he knocked my hat off my head and not only was -- it wasn't just a hat. It was a hat that had a pride parade stuck in the back of it. And I was -- about to March in the St. Petersburg Pride Parade.

So when it comes to offensive physical contact, it wasn't just the hat he knocked off my head. It



was the pride parade flag he knocked off my head.

This is Democrat on Democrat political violence at a pride parade, right? Now that's not just offensive physical contact, it's outrageous physical contact within that particular context.

I'll also point out about this -- the battery count, that Mr. Thurlow just self -- he just contradicted himself in the course of a couple of sentences about that. The first thing he said, and he said this twice actually, that I had pleaded that my hat had fallen off my head and that's ridiculous. That's just a misrepresentation of what -- of the facts as pled and what's in the court record. I never said my hat fell off my head. If my hat just fell off my head without Sherosky, you know, knocking it off -- I wouldn't have filed a --

THE COURT: Plaintiff? Plaintiff? Plaintiff?

Direct me to the paragraph numbers in your Amended

Complaint that you're speaking about. Go ahead,

please.

MR. LICCIONE: Okay, give me a second.

THE COURT: When either side argues about what is being pled, the best source is to go to the pleading itself and let the Court read it verbatim. So in this context, Plaintiff, you're arguing that



the defendant is misrepresenting your pleading.

Please direct the Court to which paragraph or

paragraphs are you speaking about, so the Court can

review it at the same time you're making your

argument.

MR. LICCIONE: Oh, fair enough, Your Honor. So starting with paragraph 30 is the first that talks about engaging in political violence, assault, and battery. So paragraph 30. 30, going on 34, 36. Okay, so it goes to paragraph 36. So the description of this incident starts there on those paragraphs.

THE COURT: And then in paragraph 36,

Plaintiff, what I heard from Mr. Thurlow earlier was

-- and his argument was a contradiction about

alleging a battery, but yet in 36, identifying that
the defendant Sherosky came "within 5 inches of

Plaintiff's face." So I want to make sure I

understand. Is it your argument that paragraph 36
is incorrect or that Mr. Thurlow misunderstood that?

MR. LICCIONE: No. That -- the 36 goes to the assault claim, Your Honor. Putting me in fear for, you know, my personal safety. That doesn't go to the battery claim. This happened right after I walked away from Mr. Sherosky, that he followed me,



stalked me, and then he put his body like 5 inches 1 2 in front of me on camera. It's on the 3 THE COURT: Please continue with whatever --4 please continue your argument. But again, if you're 5 going to argue allegations, please direct the Court to the specific paragraph in the Complaint. 6 7 MR. LICCIONE: Okay, will do. So let's see, 8 let me get back on track here. All right, so let's 9 talk about the defamation and the actual malice 10 standard. When you're, you know, talking about a 11 public figure, say Ms. Midigan (phonetic) is the 12 public figure. 13 THE COURT: I'm sorry, Plaintiff? Plaintiff, 14 let me inquire one more time of something different 15 Speaking of your comment just a moment ago 16 that paragraph 36 then speaks to the assault, not 17 the battery, which allegations support the battery 18 claim? In other words, an unwanted physical contact? 19 MR. LICCIONE: That ends at -- that starts at 20 30 and ends at 34. 21 THE COURT: Okay. And again, which of those 22 paragraphs are you alleging an unwanted physical 23 contact? 24 MR. LICCIONE: 34, where I say, "Defendant 25 Sherosky without provocation forcefully knocked off



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the hat Plaintiff was wearing which prominently displayed a pride flag and hurled -- and hurl insults at him." And that's not -- that's protected, this is just context of malice. It's proof of malice, it doesn't go to battery because hurling insults at somebody, like calling them an ass is protected speech.

Oh. And then he confirmed when asked that he wanted to hit Plaintiff. Actually, that actually goes to the assault as well. But the first -- most of that paragraph 34 up to the hurled insults part is the necessary elements properly pled for a claim of battery.

And under -- I will point out that there -- Mr. Thurlow is arguing that even that knocking someone's hat off is not offensive physical contact. Right?

Now under the -- under Clark v. State, the First

DCA found that they recognized that an unconsented touching of something intimately connected with the victim's body constitutes battery. Same thing in

Nash v. State, the Fourth DCA found that grabbing a purse held by the victim was deemed sufficient for a battery charge as the purse was considered an extension of the person. As certainly the hat on my head and the Pride flag stuck into the back of it

was intimately connected to my physical person. And so this -- that's sort of a fallacious argument.

This is a black letter case law here. So I'm focused on the battery because they're basic -- the defendants are basically arguing that political violence by a political party officer against a congressional candidate in public is protected speech and behavior under the anti-SLAPP statute.

Right? So it -- so for example, it's sort of like Donald Trump at one of his rallies say, knock -- you know, knock the hell out of or, you know, knock the hell out of that guy for, you know, interrupting my speech.

It's trying to -- it is inciting political violence at a political event, which is what the St. Pete Pride Parade was. It was a -- you know, it's a political event. I'm there to campaign as a supporter of Pride rights, you know, equal rights. And this democrat-on-democrat, you know, violence is -- was never supposed to be -- it's an unlawful -- it's a criminal act. And now Mr. Thurlow claims -- talks about this police report and all that. The police report that he had attached to his motion is a -- is a -- there were -- number one, the witnesses that were quoted were not sworn -- those -- none of

those were sworn statements. So the -- second, the people who were in the report that the police interviewed were all cherry-picked by Jennifer Griffith. They're friends, associates of Jennifer Griffith. They're members of the defense. They're members of defendant PDEC.

Those are all obviously biased witnesses, and it's not appropriate to -- in the motions to dismiss phase to consider that their statements are, you know, true. They certainly don't prove that it didn't -- that the battery didn't happen. That they -- the only thing, if they're telling the truth is that they didn't see the bat -- a battery and if it did happen. So I would ask, those are not appropriate to be considered at the motion to dismiss phase, because my allegations as pleaded are supposed to be taken as true and in the light most favorable to me and all the inferences that can be made from those factual allegations when determining a motion to dismiss on a failure to state a claim.

My -- now I'll go to the -- let me think. I'm going to go to -- next to the defamation and the evidence of actual malice standard when it -- when you're defaming a public figure. They -- Mr.

Thurlow submitted a couple days ago, a notice of



supplemental authority. And he called out the Michael Flynn case, Now in the Michael Flynn case, it basically -- it's the difference between statements of an opinion and verifiably untrue facts. Misstatements of facts that are verifiably untrue and that is verifiable that they knew they were -- the person making those statements knew they were untrue.

And in this case, as I said before, there is a not -- I was found not guilty. It's verifiable that I was found not guilty. Defendant Griffith knew I had been found not guilty. I told her in my candidate vetting form, I had been found not guilty. I offered in that candidate vetting form to provide the not guilty verdict sheet to her. She cut off all communications with me and the next communication I had after going dark and silent for the -- for several weeks, was that you failed the candidate vetting process and she wouldn't tell me why. And I didn't find out why until November of 2023, when she told the Tampa Bay Times --

THE COURT: Plaintiff.

MR. LICCIONE: -- I had --

THE COURT: Plaintiff. Plaintiff, are these in the allegations that you've alleged in your Amended



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Complaint?

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MR. LICCIONE: Yes, they are.

THE COURT: Okay. What paragraphs so I can follow along?

MR. LICCIONE: Okay. Let's see. Let me go -- okay. Starting on -- okay. Let's see. Section -- paragraph 47.

Okay. May I -- may I proceed, Your Honor?

THE COURT: You are welcome to.

All right. As a direct result MR. LICCIONE: of the Griffith disinformation and defamation campaign, Tampa Bay Times published two defamatory articles about me and it caused catastrophic damage to my campaign, my reputation, et cetera. Jennifer Griffith and others in PDEC have falsely claimed to third parties like Tampa Bay Times that I'm quilty of -- I'm a man of mortal turpitude and in her later pleadings here, she followed up by indicating that it was the assault against -- the alleged assault against my wife in Maryland, in which I was found not guilty at trial in 20 minutes. So these were patently false accusations that Jennifer Griffith was making. She knew there existed a court record proving I was found not quilty. And therefore it's verifiable. The court public records that I was

found not guilty. And I published these court records on my campaign website as well. So under the Flynn standard, this -- these are verifiable facts that were verifiably false, basically. The statements that she made to The Times.

And then in paragraph 51, if you skip ahead a little bit, Griffith and PDEC defamation disinformation campaign ended up being republished in a total of -- in terms of what I could find, four mainstream media outlets in this area that cover Florida in this area, Tampa Bay Times, Florida Politics, Politicos Florida Playbook, The Gabber Newspaper. No, that's not the next part. Gabber is not part of this. But the -- these news -- these media outlets took the lead, you know, Jennifer Griffith was the chair of the party here in Pinellas. So they assumed she -- that she wasn't They published it as if what she told lying, right? them was true. And so let's see. Let me see where this continues.

Okay. So going back to the previous argument,

I see there's additional paragraphs here in support

of the assault and battery claim. paragraph 53,

they engaged -- this goes to the conspiracy as well.

Conspiracy to promote political violence and defame



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Plaintiff in an all-out effort to undermine my congressional campaign and -- which I lost because of this. And it is because of election fraud that I'm alleging Defendants took part in. Mail ballot I lost the election. I lost political donations. My reputation has been destroyed. believe in -- as I said in paragraph 54, that this is a premeditated act, an attempt to provoke a violent response from me at the Pride Parade is to get me, like, arrested or whatever. So as it -- as it goes to the battery claim, in order for you to dismiss this case under the anti-SLAPP statute, Your Honor, you'd have to basically condone or find that battering someone at a -- at a, you know, a political event, like a Pride Parade where a candidate was marching is protected behavior, whether it's the right to assemble or the right to -- well, it's a physical battery claim that's properly plead.

So the second part of this is that under the state actor standard, Mr. Thurlow claims that his clients are not state actors. And this is incorrect as a matter of law based on case precedent. In the case Smith v. Allwright, the U.S. Supreme Court held that it addressed racial discrimination in



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primary elections. This man, Lonnie Smith was an African-American voter in Texas, was denied a right to vote in a Democratic primary. Why? Because the Democratic Party in Texas had implemented a voter vetting process. And the vetting process -- what -- had one criteria. You had to be White. You couldn't be Black. All right? So that's a form of a vetting process for voters. Now in this case, the Supreme Court found that because the Texas Democratic Party relies on the state of Texas to run its primary elections. It's not an internal election within a private organization.

They depend on the state and rely on the state to execute the primary elections on their behalf; thereby, creating that very, very strong entwinement between the party and the state. That makes them a state actor subject to constitutional scrutiny. And in this case, it was racial discrimination. In my case, it's discrimination on the basis of sex and disability and my status as a male domestic violence survivor, coping with PTSD because of acts of violence against me by my ex-wife. And so the state actor doctrine applies here. And then there's Ludke v. Kuhn, which was a case where a female reporter that worked for this Sports Illustrated --



THE COURT: Mr. Liccione, I'd like it if I 1 2 could interrupt you momentarily. You're claiming that the Pinellas Democratic Executive Committee is 3 4 a state actor; is that correct? 5 MR. LICCIONE: Yes. Due to in very serious entwinement with the state, yes. 6 7 THE COURT: Okay. All right. Are you claiming 8 that Mr. Sherosky individually or Ms. Griffith 9 individually are state actors? 10 MR. LICCIONE: Yes. 11 THE COURT: Okay. And the case that you 12 recited from Texas, did I hear you clearly to state 13 that in that circumstance, that Democratic Party ran the actual election? 14 MR. LICCIONE: No. They relied on the State of 15 16 Texas to run the election for the primary election 17 for them. 18 Okay. Go ahead, please. THE COURT: 19 MR. LICCIONE: You know, if it -- like, your 20 Honor, if they were running their own primary 21 election internally and not depending on the state 22 to run everything, you know, for that election to 23 process the votes and count them and all that, if 24 they ran it internally, like they were electing



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their own internal officers for -- which is what

they do in the -- in the -- in the party here. 1 2 fact, we just had an election on last Monday, this 3 past Monday of new officers in which Jennifer 4 Griffith stepped down and a new chair of the Pinellas Democratic Executive Committee --5 6 THE COURT: Counsel. 7 MR. LICCIONE: -- was elected. 8 THE COURT: Mr. Liccione. 9 MR. LICCIONE: Yes. 10 THE COURT: Please don't go beyond the 11 pleadings. Stay within your pleadings, sir. 12 ahead. 13 MR. LICCIONE: Okay. Will do. The second case 14 is Ludke v. --15 THE COURT: Sir, do you have a question why I 16 directed you to do that? 17 MR. LICCIONE: No. No, Your Honor. 18 THE COURT: You're giving me information 19 outside the scope of your pleadings and you just 20 referenced earlier an understanding that courts are 21 required at that motion-to-dismiss stage to stay 22 within the four corners. So Counsel, the -- or Mr. 23 Liccione, the reason I'm directing you to stay with 24 your pleading is you're giving me information 25 outside your pleading, which I'm not supposed to



consider, and I won't. So thus, I'm asking you to do this, please stay within the pleading. Go ahead, please.

MR. LICCIONE: Okay. So Your Honor, my understanding is that Mr. Thurlow just made an argument that they're a private organization, not subject to state, you know, scrutiny, the -- this Court's jurisdiction, because they're private and I'm providing an example of ways in which they do private things and private elections. Right? And so what you're saying, I think is that that's outside the four corners of my Complaint in my response to Mr. Thurlow's argument; is that correct? I'm not objecting to it. I'm just trying to -- you're limiting my ability to provide examples that I know. Oh, I understand what you're saying, Your Honor. I'll just -- if I could move on.

THE COURT: Please do.

MR. LICCIONE: All right. In the case of Ludke v. Kuhn, Ludke was a female reporter for the Sports Illustrated who was attempting to gain access to interview New York Yankees baseball players in the 1977 World Series in the -- in the -- in the Yankee Clubhouse at Yankee Stadium. In the -- in the case of Bowie Kuhn, who was the commissioner of Major

League Baseball back then, as soon as he found out that the Yankees were about to let her into their locker room to interview players. He by fiat in the moment, instituted a reporter vetting process and prevented her from getting -- gaining access to the -- to the Yankees Clubhouse and any other clubhouse across Major League Baseball.

Now in the case -- in this case, she filed a civil rights action against Bowie Kuhn and other defendants argued that the policy violated her rights under the 14th Amendment on the basis of her The U.S. District Court for the Southern sex. District of New York held that the policy constituted state action and violated Ludke's equal protection rights. And the court reasoned that the City's significant -- the City's ownership of Yankee Stadium, the facility and the New York Yankees lease arrangement with the Yankees with the State of New New York City's lease arrangement with the Yankees rendered the teams and Major League Baseball's actions subject to constitutional scrutiny. So -- it's all about the state actor doctrine and the degree to which there's an entwinement between the private organization, and public facilities, and the -- and the state.



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this is a case with another -- there's another vetting policy. This one was based, not on race, but on sex, and it was supplied to -- she was the first woman that tried to gain access to a major league baseball clubhouse -- you know, locker room.

Further, in this case, at the St. Pete College Epicenter in Clearwater, Florida, every month Ms. Griffith and PDEC defendants lease or rent a meeting room inside the St. Pete College Epicenter in Clearwater. That facility is a state-owned facility. They're a state college, right? leases a meeting room, just a meeting room inside the epicenter. She did not lease the hallway outside the meeting room or the lobby, right? has -- only has really any kind of authority inside the meeting room. Now, Mr. Thurlow claims that a sign was stolen or swiped my campaign sign, which just said John Liccione for Congress. She -- he's claiming that the sign was swiped inside the meeting It wasn't. It was as properly pled, it was room. -- it was swiped in the hallway where I was camp -attempting to campaign and talk to voters as they left her meeting. I wasn't interfering with the meeting. I was expressing my First Amendment right to free speech. The speech on my -- the writing on



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my sign with speech. I was -- again, I was trying to talk to voters as they left her meeting. I'm basically campaigning in the hall -- I'm literally campaigning in the hallway in a peaceful way, not interfering with her proceedings, and she came out of the -- stormed out of the meeting room when it was over and got and started haranguing me and assumed -- attempted to assume the role of state actor to enforce what she claimed was the college policy of not letting political signage inside their building.

She literally said that to me, take your sign down. You're not allowed to have -- this college won't allow you to have campaign signs anywhere, so take the sign down.

And I just -- I told her, hey, deescalate. You don't have no power over me, you know, here. I'm not doing anything wrong.

And then she went and grabbed a security officer and told her -- and snitched on me and then he came back and he just looked at the sign and did not -- did nothing, right? So that's sort of a couple wrongful acts, that's trying to assume the role of state actor to enforce a college policy, a state college policy of no campaign sign, and then

interfering with my electioneering, my campaigning activity, preventing me from displaying my political sign, my campaign sign, preventing me from talking to voters as they -- and again, and introducing myself to voters as they left her meeting and we're outside her meeting.

So I want to make it clear. This is a sort of an additional case where she -- there -- there's state actor entwinement because she's leasing the facility from the state and she herself attempted to assume the role, just by her own behavior, of the -of a state actor enforcing a college policy, state college policy, so that -- none of that is protected -- is protected behavior under the First Amendment or under the -- or it's -- or under the anti-SLAPP statute. The anti-SLAPP statute can't be used to dismiss non-frivolous claims. The SLAPP protections don't extend to shield conduct or statements that are actionable under established legal principles. My claims for defamation, conspiracy, and election interference are all grounded in substandard law and are not frivolous, and they're certainly not retaliatory.

Your Honor, I'm -- I was basically trying to get this misbehavior, this -- these wrongful acts to



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stop. That was my motivation for filing these lawsuits. It wasn't to quell free speech, you know, political --

THE COURT: Plaintiff. I appreciate your description of your motivation, but once again, if you could stay within the four corners of your Complaint. We're also at 11:20, running out of time. So I'd respectfully ask the plaintiff to do your best to wrap up in the next two minutes with your response to the motions to dismiss.

MR. LICCIONE: Okay. Your Honor, when Mr.

Thurlow makes an argument in support of his Motion
to Dismiss, I'm allowed to counter that to rebut
that argument, and that's what I'm doing. I'm
staying within the four corners of the Complaint,
the Motion to Dismiss, and Mr. Thurlow's argument.

And I'd ask that you allow me to continue and not -and not interrupt me in the middle of it on the
claim that it's outside the four corner of the
Complaint.

THE COURT: Mr. Liccione -- Mr. Liccione, let me make sure I'm clear about something with you, sir. You started to describe to me your intent behind your actions, the filing of this Complaint. You started to describe to me that you just wanted



your actions to stop. As much as I appreciate you sharing that with me, it's not pertinent to your pleading, and it's not pertinent to the motions to dismiss that we're hearing today, so yes, sir.

MR. LICCIONE: Your --

THE COURT: I'll be redirecting you back to -I am redirecting you back to your pleadings and any
argument that's germane, either in factor in law,
but to go outside the scope of that is frankly, a
waste of our time in light of the fact that we now
have nine minutes left for the hearing, sir. Go
ahead and please wrap those for the next minute and
a half. Thank you.

MR. LICCIONE: Okay, Your Honor. I will point out that in the introduction to mister -- to

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, the first paragraph states -- the first sentence says, "Plaintiff's modus operandi in filing this lawsuit is to seek revenge against PCDEC and its chair and its secretary for declining to support Plaintiff's candidacy for the United States Congress and declining to provide Plaintiff" -- "Plaintiff with a platform for his candidacy." So I think what I'm hearing you say, Your Honor, is that I'm not allowed to rebut the first sentence, the first -- he -- he's

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saying that I have a -- a lawsuit.

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THE COURT: Mr. Liccione -- Mr. Liccione, you're welcome to rebut whatever you'd like to, sir, but I'm going to be extremely candid with you. the court reads a paragraph like that, it has no legal bearing on my decision-making. I completely understand why one party wants to refute what's going on, and that happens pretty much in every case. From a legal and technical and procedural standpoint, that's not something that I look to as a basis to be a decision- maker under these motions today. So sir, you're welcome to spend the rest of your one minute telling me about the intent behind your Complaint, if you'd like to, but you're unfortunately losing time to get to the substantive arguments on a legal or factual basis. Go ahead, Mr. Liccione. In the next minute, you're welcome to conclude however way you'd like to, sir.

MR. LICCIONE: Okay, Your Honor. I had no way of knowing that, but that's why I was --. Thank you. So my -- the anti-SLAPP statutes don't apply to election fraud, right? A political party, political operatives, political party officers engaging in mail ballot fraud is not an anti-SLAPP protected behavior. It's criminal. It's a violation of my



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civil rights to free and fair elections. So the 1 2 defendants' motion, it really misapplies First 3 Amendment protections, the reliance on the First 4 Amendment to shield their conducts misplaced. While 5 the First Amendment certainly protects expressions 6 of opinion, it doesn't protect defamatory statements 7 made out of malice, actual malice or reckless 8 disregard for the truth. It doesn't shield conduct 9 that constitutes election interference, voter 10 intimidation as I pled, civil rights violations, 11 assault, battery. And my pleadings, my allegations 12 when taken as true, establish that defendants 13 exceeded the bounds of constitutionally protected 14 speech. And I'll leave it there, Your Honor. 15 think that's -- my minutes up. 16 THE COURT: Have you had a full opportunity to 17 respond to the motion today? 18 MR. LICCIONE: No, Your Honor. You cut -- you 19 said I only had one minute left and I wasn't done, 20 but --21 THE COURT: How much more time do you need? 22 MR. LICCIONE: I'd like another three minutes, 23 Your Honor. 24 THE COURT: Go ahead. Three minutes. 25 MR. LICCIONE: Okay. And mister -- Defendant's



Motion to Dismiss makes numerous factual allegations that are not in the court record and are not supported by sworn affidavit. On page 1 of their Motion to Dismiss, if you look at the footnotes, it says that Michael Sherosky is the duly elected secretary of the PCDEC, which is an unpaid volunteer part-time position. There's no -- there's no sworn affidavit about that. It's not in the case record.

Jennifer Griffith is an unpaid volunteer position as well. Again, not in the case record, not supported by sworn affidavit. And this is true throughout. I -- I'm not sure you were aware I -- I'm sort of saying this because I'm -- I don't know in advance whether you will consider something, an unsworn factual statement that's not sworn by sworn affidavit. So I want to make sure that the Court doesn't consider things that are not supposed to -- that, you know, you said is, you know, you're not going to supposed to consider, so --

I want to talk about the Marriott Hotel incident where I was -- where defendants erected tables to prevent voters from attending and talking with me at my campaign event, which was held down the hall in the Marriott Hotel from the Democratic Congressional debate that I -- that I was invited

to. And by the way, they can not invite me to debate. That's protected behavioral speech, but blocking tables -- of placing blocking tables in the hallway of a hotel to prevent and forcing the voters that attended their event down the back exit, the side exit stairwell in the rain at night, that's not protected speech. That's campaign inter -- that's election interference, campaign interference, so that -- I hadn't spoken about that before.

I would say -- I'll wrap up saying that they have failed to make a prima facie case that this is a strategic lawsuit against public participation.

All of these -- I'm suing them because of all these wrongful acts, battery, assault, defamation with actual malice, election interference, election fraud, civil rights violations. They're state actors. They're so entwined with the state through the Dallas County Supervised Elections, which runs the primary elections for them, that they're subject to constitutional scrutiny and civil rights violations are proper to be these -- those counts are properly brought. Thank you, Your Honor. That's it.

THE COURT: Plaintiff, have you had that full opportunity now to respond to both of the defense



motions to dismiss? 1 2 MR. LICCIONE: Yes, sir. 3 THE COURT: For the -- Mr. Thurlow, do you have 4 any rebuttal that I haven't already heard fairly 5 quickly. Go ahead, please. MR. THURLOW: I'll just highlight that 6 7 Kissinger v. Mahoning County Republican Party case 8 at page 727. Providing a forum for a candidate to 9 speak is not analogous to participating in the 10 election process. That is what the court held in 11 that case, and I think that ultimately is a very 12 relevant fact. And the plaintiff also admitted that 13 he was criminally charged, both in his pleading and 14 in his argument. And that means that there's some 15 probable cause for those criminal charges, 16 presumably. So in terms of a legal basis for actual 17 malice, I don't think he's met it. Thank you, Your 18 Honor. 19 THE COURT: Mr. Thurlow, have you had a full 20 opportunity to argue both of your motions today? 21 MR. THURLOW: Yes, Your Honor. 22 THE COURT: And again, Mr. Liccione, you've had 23 a full opportunity to respond to both motions, 24 correct? 25 MR. LICCIONE: Yes, sir.



THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Thurlow, please prepare an order for me today. I'll walk through count by On Counts I and II, I'll deny the Motion to Dismiss on the bases of Count I being battery and Count II being assault. I'm going to -- I am going to ask for the repleading of those, though, within an amended complaint because I want to make sure that I understand what the damages are that's being alleged, primarily for it to support the subject matter jurisdiction. With regard to Count III, vicarious liability, I'm granting it, but with leave The concern the Court has based upon the to amend. arguments in reading Count III, it simply says vicariously liable, but then it references Paragraphs 8 through 56, more along the lines of a more definitive statement. I believe Plaintiff has an obligation to explain to each one of the defendants separately as to what actions occurred that support some type of vicarious liability and more importantly vicarious liability of what?

In paragraph 64, which is the only pertinent paragraph of Count III, other than paragraph 63, being a reallegation of Paragraphs 8 through 56, it simply says that Griffith and Pinellas Democrat Executive are liable for the actions of Sherosky.



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Again, that requires a more definitive statement as to what conspiracy -- conspiratorial acts occurred for each defendant. So relative to Count III, it's granted with leave to amend. I'll talk about the timeframe in which to file an amended complaint in a The same applies under Count IV, which is Again, in paragraph 65, the plaintiff conspiracy. realleges Paragraphs 8 -- 8 through 56, but then lumps all of the defendants together with regard to a violation of election loss. The concern I have there is it talks about how the allegation in 69, the defendants' actions intended to impede Plaintiff's ability to campaign freely. This is the intent of Florida Statute 768.25 -- 295. dismissing Count V with prejudice per the argument of defense Counsel that the case law authority in Florida supports dismissal with prejudice. So Count V, violation of election laws against all defendants is dismissed with prejudice. With regard to Count VI, violation of civil rights, I'm granting the Motion to Dismiss without prejudice. In other words, leave to amend. It's not proper to allege violations of Florida law along with federal law. If the plaintiff's in a position to feel like violations of civil rights occurred according to



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JACKSONVILLE, FL 32801 TAMPA, FL 33602 Florida law, that would stand as one count. If you believe that violations of federal law standalone, that would be a second count. The other concern that I have is -- let me look back here at my note.

Plaintiff argues that he is a protected class.

It doesn't really argue the protected class status, not a requirement, but a suggestion that when Plaintiff amends this count, that can -- that Plaintiff clarify exactly his standing as a protected class under either a state or a federal civil rights violation. So again, under Count number VI, that's dismissed without prejudice.

Count VII is also dismissed without prejudice to refile an amended complaint, alleging all of the elements necessary to meet a defamation claim that's required as a matter of pleading.

With Count VIII, that's granted with prejudice.

Count VIII is not a standalone count. Counts are

causes of action. Count VIII simply describes

damages. Again, as a suggestion for Plaintiff and

not a requirement, this Court must have subject

matters -- subject matter jurisdiction, which

requires a threshold amount being seeked as a

recovery. You've alleged in some of these, at least

one of these, that you meet the threshold above

\$50,000. Suggestion, but not a requirement, that you identify what you believe damages have occurred per your count, as opposed to leaving it just to a final count for damages. Because again, procedurally that's not accurate. A count for damages should be pled as damages supporting, or -- that are supported by causes of action.

I'm going to give the -- in light of the fact that it's December 13th, I will give the defense -- plaintiff until December 30 to file an amended complaint. Mr. Thurlow, any -- and I'm sorry, you also argued with regard to the causes of action filed in the Clearwater case, what's been referenced to this case, 393 -- excuse me, 24-3939, the Clearwater case. I agree with defense counsel that there's no private rights of action, and it fails to allege sufficient elements. I will grant it without prejudice to see if the plaintiff can resurrect that and be able to describe the basis to have a private right of action under those claims, but more particularly the plaintiff shall replete specific elements to support those allegations.

Mr. Thurlow, any questions about what's in that order today? Anything else you'd like to address in that order today?



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MR. THURLOW: To clarify, with the counts granted without prejudice, was that under anti-SLAPP, or for other reasons?

THE COURT: I -- I'm sorry, I -- I'm not sure if I understand your question. Ask it again, please.

MR. THURLOW: So you granted the Motion to

Dismiss on Counts VI, VII, and -- VI and VII without

prejudice, as well as in the Clearwater case, I

believe all the counts without prejudice.

Does that make any kind of decision on the applicability of anti-SLAPP, or is the Court deferring ruling on that?

THE COURT: No. The Court is fine that what you all call anti-SLAPP, it's actually referred to as the SLAPP statute 768.295. That statute applies to Paragraph number 5, which is the violation of election laws. Again, I'm going to not necessarily apply it for purposes of dismissing with prejudice. As to Count VI, I am going to give the plaintiff an opportunity to reallege that in an amended complaint. And I want to be clear for Defense because I think this might go part and parcel to your question. There's no prohibition, once an amended complaint is filed, to reargue the SLAPP

statute to see if it's applicable to what's been in 1 2 -- under the amended complaint. 3 Thurlow, does that address your question? 4 MR. THURLOW: Yes, it does, Your Honor. 5 THE COURT: Okay. Anything else, Mr. Thurlow, 6 for the preparation of the order today? 7 MR. THURLOW: Not at this time. THE COURT: Plaintiff, any questions about 8 9 what's in the order, and any -- anything else you 10 believe the Court should address in that order 11 today? 12 MR. LICCIONE: Yes, Your Honor. I was a little 13 fuzzy on when you were covering the Clearwater 14 counts. Could you identify again for me which 15 counts --THE COURT: All counts in the Clearwater case 16 17 -- all counts in the Clearwater case, which is case 18 number 24-3939-CI, that applied to Jennifer 19 Griffith, because those were consolidated. 20 And as a -- as a side note, if you will, 21 Jennifer Griffith is no longer part of the pleadings 22 in case number 24-3939. I need the Clearwater case. 23 So anything that applies to Jennifer Griffith must 24 be contained in the amended complaint that the



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plaintiff files if Plaintiff chooses to file that

amended complaint and does so by December 30th. The dismissal is granted without prejudice.

Making a note for you, Mr. Liccione, that I don't believe you've properly identified a private right of action, and I don't believe you've properly pled sufficient allegations to submit your causes of action. I'm giving you another opportunity to do that.

The defense counsel has an opportunity to come back once you filed that amended complaint and file whatever response he would like to. If it includes a notion to dismiss, the Court will reconsider any argument that he would like to make, which would include, but not be limited to that the plaintiff hasn't established a private right of action, and/or that the plaintiff hasn't sufficiently alleged the required elements to support each cause of action, and the applicability of the SLAPP statute.

Mr. Liccione, does that help clarify your question?

MR. LICCIONE: Yes, sir. I'm good.

THE COURT: Anything else -- anything else that you would like the Court to address in that order today?

MR. LICCIONE: No, sir.



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THE COURT: Mr. Liccione, you're required to start working with Plaintiff's -- Defense counsel on a case management order that basically gets us to full disposition. I would ask that you start to circulate a draft of that, knowing however, that you have a deadline of December 30 to file an amended complaint if you choose to.

Any questions on that?

MR. LICCIONE: You're talking about a draft of the amended -- the new amended complaint, correct, Your Honor?

THE COURT: The order today is granting the Motion to Dismiss. The only two counts that I did not grant the Motion to Dismiss, are Counts I and II.

MR. LICCIONE: Okay.

THE COURT: The battery -- the battery count and the assault count. Let me be clear, if the plaintiff doesn't file an amended complaint, all of the other counts have gone away, to use a manner speaking, including anything that was filed against Ms. Griffith in case 24-3939. If you do not file an amended complaint, then you'd have to make sure that this Court understands how you meet the subject matter threshold to support your battery claim and



your assault claim. If you file an amended complaint, again, you must readdress Counts II through VIII, and again, VIII being damages, which the Court finds is not a cause of action. And you're also addressing all of the counts that you include against Ms. Griffith in case number 24-3939. The deadline to file that amended complaint is December 30.

Liccione, any other questions?

MR. LICCIONE: Yeah -- yes, Your Honor. just asking about when you said that I need to start circulating a draft. I need to start circulating a draft. I'm just trying to get clarity on what -- a draft of what exactly?

THE COURT: A case management order. If you'll read our administrative orders, we require a case management order that acts as a scheduling order that gets this case to full disposition within the Supreme Court mandated timeframe, okay?

MR. LICCIONE: Right. But you said that Mr. Thurlow is supposed to draft it, not me. So he's the one that needs to circulate it, correct? just trying to get clarity on that, who drafts the order?

THE COURT: I believe you're confused.



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me clarify. The order from today is granting the 1 2 motions to dismiss separately. In all civil 3 litigation, we require a case management order that 4 acts as a scheduling order. 5 MR. LICCIONE: Well --6 THE COURT: The plaintiff --7 MR. LICCIONE: Okay. 8 THE COURT: -- if you look at -- if you look at 9 the case file, in the case file there's a case 10 management status order filed on August 29 of 2024. 11 If you go to paragraph 7 of that order, it 12 specifically states what the plaintiff's obligations 13 are. Please make sure you comply with that. 14 MR. LICCIONE: All right. I'll do. Thank you. 15 THE COURT: From a case management standpoint, 16 what I'm going to do is this, I'm going to have any 17 other -- all other pending motions to be reset, 18 because we've run out of time today, along with 19 another case management conference. And what I'm 20 going to do is this, Mr. Thurlow, please include the 21 meet and confer requirement as I've described 22 previously before any future motions are filed. The 23 parties shall meet and confer. If a motion is

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filed, it shall be set for hearing. In my opinion,

that's timely set as 30 days or less. And if there

is a hearing that there's another meet and confer before the hearing occurs, counsel's failure to meet and confer is not necessarily actionable amongst the parties. The Court will simply take that into consideration if the Court wants to consider imposing sanctions.

So counsels -- or excuse me, so parties on both sides, Mr. Liccione and Mr. Thurlow, please don't file arguments about a failure to meet and confer and seek sanctions. You're welcome to bring that up in the context of any hearing we have, but please make sure that you understand, it is mandated by the Court for meets and confers.

Mr. Thurlow, the latitude here is this, I don't know your response to the amended complaint that's required to be filed by December 30. If your response is another motion to dismiss, again, I would ask you, and I'm sorry, the exception will be no meet and confer if it's a motion to dismiss. And the reason for the exception is, I would imagine that it's going to be very similar arguments that you both have made. If you all would like to confer on it, you are welcome to, but I'll -- I won't require for a motion to dismiss.

So Mr. Thurlow, if your response to the amended



complaint is a motion dismiss, I would ask that you get that filed for a hearing timely. I would ask that you work with the -- Mr. Liccione to have enough time for that motion to be heard. Also include a case management conference, and also include all pending motions. It's difficult to find an hour on my docket, it's less difficult to find a half hour. What I'm trying to do is get you back timely, but also at the same time, trying to create a sufficient amount of time to hear as many motions as we can.

With that as the objective, we'll do our best to balance it, but I want to make sure we have at least enough time to hear any motion to dismiss as well as a case management. All of the pending motions will also be noticed and we'll hear it on a time permitted basis.

Mr. Thurlow, if you choose to file an answer and amended complaint, then counsels, I would ask you to set all pending motions in a case management conference within the next 45 to 60 days after the answer and affirmative defense have been filed.

Mr. Thurlow, any questions on that?

MR. THURLOW: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I don't need to include that in a



1 case management order per se, since we have a court 2 reporter today, but that's the objective, depending 3 on how the defense responds to the amended 4 complaint. 5 For the plaintiff, any questions about the case management discussion? 6 7 MR. LICCIONE: No, sir. 8 THE COURT: Everybody on this call have a great 9 rest of your day and stay safe. 10 MR. THURLOW: Thank you, Your Honor. 11 MR. LICCIONE: Thank you, Your Honor. 12 THE REPORTER: Thank you, Your Honor. 13 (HEARING CONCLUDED AT 11:44 A.M. ET) 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25



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TOMORROW'S TECHNOLOGY TODAY

1	CERTIFICATE
2	
3	STATE OF FLORIDA)
4	COUNTY OF ORANGE)
5	
6	I, Vanessa McCormick, Court Reporter and Notary
7	Public for the State of Florida at Large, do hereby
8	certify that I was authorized to and did report the
9	foregoing proceeding, and that said transcript is a true
LO	record of the said proceeding.
L1	
L2	I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not of counsel for,
L3	related to, or employed by any of the parties or
L 4	attorneys involved herein, nor am I financially
L5	interested in said action.
L 6	
L7	Submitted on: February 7, 2025
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L 9	
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21	Vareport meuris
22	
23	Vanessa McCormick
24	Court Reporter, Notary Public
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TOMORROW'S TECHNOLOGY TODAY

EXHIBIT E

407.423.9900 Fax 407.841.2779 Toll Free 855-MYDEPOS REPORTING COMPANY ECHNOLOGY TODAY

1 IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT,

2 IN AND FOR PINELLAS COUNTY, FLORIDA

ORIGINAL

3 CASE NO.: 24-002994-CI

4 DIVISION: SECTION 19

5

- 6 JOHN LICCIONE,
- 7 Petitioner

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9 V.

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- 11 PINELLAS DEMOCRATIC EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, ET AL,
- 12 Respondents

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14 HEARING

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21 DATE: JANUARY 28, 2025

22 REPORTER: DANIELA RODRIGUEZ-GUERRERO

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OMORROW'S

MILESTONE

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1
                          APPEARANCES
 2
   PRO SE:
 3
   John W. Liccione
 5
   6800 Gulfport Boulevard South
   Suite 201-116
 6
   South Pasadena, Florida 33707
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   Telephone No.: (443) 698-8156
 8
 9
   E-mail: jliccione@gmail.com
10
   (Appeared via teleconference)
11
12
   ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS, PINELLAS DEMOCRATIC
13
   EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, MICHAEL J. SHEROSKY, AND JENNIFER
14
   W. GRIFFITH:
   George A.D. Thurlow, Esquire
15
16
   Rahdert & Mortimer, P.A.
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   Suite 200
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   St. Petersburg, Florida 33701
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   Telephone No.: (727) 823-4191
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   E-mail: GThurlow@rahdertlaw.com
22
   (Appeared via teleconference)
23
24
   Also Present: Thomas Ramsberger; Mark Herron, Interested
25
   Party
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TOMORROW'S TECHNOLOGY TODAY

1 STIPULATION 2 The hearing was taken at MILESTONE REPORTING COMPANY, 3 315 EAST ROBINSON STREET, SUITE 510, ORLANDO, FLORIDA 5 32801, via teleconference in which all participants attended remotely, on TUESDAY the 28th day of JANUARY 6 7 2025 at 3:30 p.m. (ET); said hearing was taken pursuant 8 to the FLORIDA Rules of Civil Procedure 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25



PROCEEDINGS 1 2 THE COURT: Afternoon. This is Judge 3 Ramsberger for the 3:30 hearing. This is case 24-4 2994. Do we have counsel, or do we have the 5 plaintiff on? MR. LICCIONE: Yes. Plaintiff John Liccione 6 7 here. THE COURT: You're still pro se; is that 8 9 correct? 10 MR. LICCIONE: That's correct, sir. 11 THE COURT: All right. And how about for the 12 defendants? Do we have counsel on the call? 13 MR. THURLOW: Yes. George Thurlow on behalf of Defendant Pinellas Democratic Executive Committee, 14 15 Michael John Sherosky, and Jennifer Griffith. 16 THE COURT: All right. And then good 17 afternoon. How about a court reporter? Do we have 18 a court reporter today? 19 THE REPORTER: Yes, Your Honor. Daniela 20 Rodriguez with Milestone. 21 THE COURT: All right. Good. Good afternoon. 22 Again, Daniela, we spoke earlier. You were on 23 before my last hearing was over, correct? 24 THE REPORTER: Yes, Your Honor. 25 THE COURT: Thank you. Anybody else on the



call today? 1 2 MR. HERRON: Yes. Mark Herron, an interested 3 citizen. THE COURT: All right. Good afternoon. 4 5 To listen in, please mute your microphone. 6 Anybody else? All right. I see two motions filed 7 by the plaintiff. One is in a motion to extend a 8 deadline to file a second amended complaint. Looks like that motion was filed December 30th, 2024. 9 10 then the second motion by Plaintiff is a motion for 11 clarification. Mr. Liccione, did -- let me start 12 with this. Did you get a copy of the transcript 13 from the last hearing that we had back on December 13th of 2024? 14 MR. LICCIONE: I haven't yet, Your Honor. 15 16 THE COURT: You prepared the order granting the 17 defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended 18 Complaints; is that correct? 19 MR. LICCIONE: No. George Thurlow did. 20 Attorney Thurlow did. 21 THE COURT: Mr. Thurlow you prepared that 22 order? 23 MR. THURLOW: That is correct, Your Honor. 24 prepared that order, ran it by Mr. Liccione, who has



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an objection, which was noted in our cover letter.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Liccione, I've gone through the order before I have entered it, and the order is consistent with my notes, and I would think consistent with a transcript of the hearing with regard to addressing each and every one of the counts in your amended -- or in your complaint. And I want to be clear, I believe you unilaterally filed an amended complaint already that the courts rejected, so this would be addressing a time in which you were to file an amended complaint, which gave you December 30th of 2024 to file that complaint, correct?

MR. LICCIONE: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Okay. So sir, I'm going to start with this premise. This order is consistent with my notes. It clearly goes through and either denies or grants, and it says with or without prejudice when appropriate. So what is the clarification that you're looking for that's not clear from this order?

MR. LICCIONE: Yeah. There are two areas on this order. The one is the last paragraph which says, "Nothing in this order shall be construed as an adjudication of defendant's legal or factual defenses, including the applicability of Florida Statute 768-95, except as otherwise provided, and

Defendants are permitted to raise these issues for adjudication by the court in subsequent motions." So there's that issue. That -- that's the one I'm requesting clarification on, as I've pleaded in my motion for clarification. And then the second thing is on the first page of the order, there's a Number 1 that talks about -- you denied the motion to dismiss on Counts 1 and 2 of battery and assault as they -- "as they pertain to defendant Michael Sherosky." So there's a second issue there that I'm seeking clarification on. And the clarification is going to drive my decision, assuming you grant me an extension, on whether I do file an amended complaint, second amended complaint. Because in the absence of clarification, my -- I feel I'm being prejudiced because I'm not sure. Anyway, so that --I'll stop there. So that's what I -- so that's what I'm seeking clarification on. Those are the things that I -- Mr. Thurlow and I did not agree with. you know -- and that's what I'm seeing clarification on here.

THE COURT: Okay. And I want to be careful about something, and I'll put it on the record this way. When somebody asks for clarification, they certainly have that right, and I certainly have the



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TOMORROW'S TECHNOLOGY TODAY

obligation to look. What's difficult for me is to go back and change something that might be inconsistent with a prior ruling. And so if I have a hesitancy to clarify something that does not need to be clarified, I want Plaintiff to understand. That's the concern this Court always has. other words, I'm not being asked to re-rule on something. That would be a motion for reconsideration. Let me address the second -- the first point first. If you go to that last paragraph, when it says, counsel -- excuse me, when it says that, forgive me, "nothing in this order shall be construed." Plaintiff, I'm not sure what else to tell you other than the plain reading of this is pretty clear. I have not made any ruling on the merits of any applicable defenses. Depending on whether you file an amended complaint or not will determine how the defendant responds. And again, you seem to be somewhat versed in the law, so you should understand that parties are entitled to respond to lawsuits. A response could be another motion to dismiss. If they file what's called a responsive pleading, then that's an answer. include affirmative defenses. It may include a counterclaim. So my understanding of the reason why



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TOMORROW'S TECHNOLOGY TODAY

JACKSONVILLE, FL 32801 TAMPA, FL 33602 defense counsel put this in there is to make it clear. The only thing that I've ruled upon at the hearing was your complaint, so nothing is to be construed in this order that would limit anything that the defense wants to respond to. I want to be abundantly clear about something. It doesn't mean that their answer and affirmative defenses and any counterclaim goes forward. It just means they have a right to go ahead and raise those as defenses. So nothing's been adjudicated today in this order that I entered on December 20th. Plaintiff, any questions about the clarification?

MR. LICCIONE: Am I going to be made -- given the opportunity to make oral argument, Your Honor, or not? I'd like to clarify --

THE COURT: None. No, none whatsoever, because Mr. Liccione, you asked for clarification, and my clarification is that the document speaks for itself. I've given --

MR. LICCIONE: That -- that's -- let me talk -THE COURT: -- you some additional information
so you can understand the plain reading of it, but
the plain reading of it is --

MR. LICCIONE: I'm going to go on the record now, Your Honor --



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THE COURT: -- no adjudication of the defense -
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       - legal or factual defenses regardless of the --
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            MR. LICCIONE: -- that you denied the motion to
       dismiss on Counts 1 and 2 --
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            THE COURT: Mr. Liccione, can you stop talking?
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            MR. LICCIONE: -- which were based on an anti-
 7
       SLAPP defense.
 8
            THE COURT: Mister --
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            MR. LICCIONE: You grant -- you denied their
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       motion.
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            THE COURT: -- Liccione, can you stop talking?
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       Counsel --
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            MR. LICCIONE:
                            Therefore, anti-SLAPP has been
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       knocked down and this now rescue is now barred by
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       lateral estoppel from being brought up on argument
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       again.
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            THE COURT: Are you done, Mr. Liccione?
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            MR. LICCIONE: So your statements, Your Honor,
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       that --
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            THE COURT: Liccione, are you done?
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            MR. LICCIONE: No, I'm not done.
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            THE COURT: Okay. Counsel, I'm adjourning this
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       hearing.
                We're resetting it in person. Mr.
24
       Liccione, I'm going to include an order to show
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       cause hearing for you. Sir, I gave you a warning to
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stop talking because you're interrupting the Court's That's contemptible, okay? What I'm business. going to do is have a hearing in person. going to address your motions today in person, as well as my order to show cause why not to hold you in contempt for interrupting the Court and interrupting the Court's business. If you cannot afford an attorney, I'll appoint a public defender to represent you. If I make a finding of contempt, then I'll do the penalty phase. The penalty phase may include issuing sanctions, which may include incarceration up to one day short of six months. Mr. Liccione, do you have any questions about resetting these motions for hearing in person, along with an order to show cause hearing for your conduct?

MR. LICCIONE: I understand what you're saying, sir.

THE COURT: Very good. I'll make sure that we do this within the next two to three weeks, if possible, Mr. Thurlow, please reach out to my office through my judicial assistant and I'll be providing dates and times to have that in hearing. Actually, I'm going to correct myself. That's just going to be on an order to show cause hearing. The motion

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for clarification is denied because the order speaks for itself. Mr. Liccione decided to interrupt the Court and not wants to hear a clarification on Number 1. Number 1, Paragraph number 1 in the order clearly speaks for itself. So the response by this Judge to this pro se plaintiff is, the plain reading of the order speaks for themselves on both issues raised. No need for further clarification. Therefore, motion denied. Motion for Deadline denied. That -- excuse me. Mr. Liccione, I want to be clear about something. I'm denying your request for an extension. However, you already got it by 30 days because we're here at least one month later. In my order that Mr. Thurlow is going to prepare and upload to JAWS by no later than 4:00 p.m. tomorrow, the Court is going to extend your deadline to file an amended complaint, if desired, by no later than 4:00 p.m., and that's going to be one week from today. So Mr. Thurlow, you can include that date and time, one week from today. If it's not filed by then, then it's delinquent. Mr. Thurlow, any question about the order today that I'll have you prepare so it's uploaded to JAWS? MR. THURLOW: No questions, Your Honor. THE COURT: 1 and 2 denied. However, because



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Plaintiff came back 30 days after the deadline, I 1 2 believe Mr. Thurlow, that's going to be February 3 4th, correct? 4 MR. THURLOW: That's my read of the calendar, 5 Your Honor. 6 THE COURT: February 4th of 2025, 4:00 p.m. 7 deadline for second amended -- for the amended 8 complaint, if Plaintiff desires. So now what I'll 9 do is have Plaintiff -- you reach out to my judicial 10 assistant and you can coordinate a date and time 11 with Mr. Liccione to have his order show cause 12 hearing in person. Mr. Thurlow, any questions about 13 that? 14 MR. THURLOW: No questions, Your Honor. 15 THE COURT: Very good. Make sure that there's 16 a court reporter present. Mr. Liccione, any 17 questions about the Court's order today? 18 MR. LICCIONE: No, sir. 19 THE COURT: Thank you, sir. Have a good rest 20 of your day and stay safe, everybody. 21 MR. THURLOW: Thank you, Your Honor. 22 MR. HERRON: Thank you, Your Honor. 23 (HEARING CONCLUDED AT 3:41 P.M. ET) 24 25

1	CERTIFICATE
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3	STATE OF FLORIDA)
4	COUNTY OF ORANGE)
5	
6	I, Daniela Rodriguez-Guerrero, Court Reporter and
7	Notary Public for the State of Florida at Large, do
8	hereby certify that I was authorized to and did report
9	the foregoing proceeding, and that said transcript is a
LO	true record of the said proceeding.
L1	
L2	I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not of counsel for,
L3	related to, or employed by any of the parties or
L 4	attorneys involved herein, nor am I financially
L5	interested in said action.
L 6	
L7	Submitted on: February 7, 2025
L8	
L 9	
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23	DANIELA RODRIGUEZ-GUERRERO
24	Court Reporter, Notary Public
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TOMORROW'S TECHNOLOGY TODAY



IN THE CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR PINELLAS COUNTY STATE OF FLORIDA, CIVIL DIVISION CASE NO.: 24-002994-CI-19

JOHN WILLIAM LICCIONE,

Plaintiff.

VS.

PINELLAS DEMOCRATIC EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, ET AL,

Defendants.

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

THIS CAUSE came before the Court for telephonic hearing on January 28, 2025, during which the Plaintiff, John William Liccione, disrupted the Court numerous times and, after being advised by the Judge to not disrupt the hearing, continued to disrupt the Court's business. The Plaintiff engaged in similar conduct during two prior telephonic hearings. The Court is hereby entering this Order to Show Cause for the Plaintiff to explain why the Court should not find the Plaintiff in direct criminal contempt pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.830 for the Plaintiff's misconduct during the hearing. Therefore, it is hereby

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:

The Plaintiff, John William Liccione, is hereby ordered to appear in person before the Court on:

Date/Time: Tuesday, February 11, 2025, at 11:45a.m.
Judge: Thomas Ramsberger, Circuit Judge
Location: St. Petersburg Judicial Building

545 1st Avenue North, 2nd Floor, Courtroom 2A

St. Petersburg, Florida 33701

The Plaintiff will at that time provide the Court with testimony as to why he should not be found in contempt. Should the Court find the Plaintiff in contempt, then the Court will set another hearing to determine if any sanctions will be imposed upon the Plaintiff, including but not limited to, incarceration for such contempt.

FAILURE OF JOHN WILLIAM LICCIONE TO APPEAR IN COURT AT THE SCHEDULED TIME MAY RESULT IN THE COURT <u>ISSUING A WARRANT FOR HIS ARREST</u>. IF ARRESTED, YOU MAY BE HELD IN JAIL UP TO FORTY-EIGHT (48) HOURS BEFORE A HEARING IS HELD.

DONE AND ORDERED at St. Petersburg, Pinellas County, Florida, on February , 2025.

Electronically Conformed 2/3/2025 Thomas Ramsberger

THOMAS RAMSBERGER

Circuit Judge

<u>Copies furnished via JAWS to:</u> John William Liccione, Plaintiff, Pro Se George Thurlow, Counsel for Defendants

EXHIBIT G

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR PINELLAS COUNTY STATE OF FLORIDA, CIVIL DIVISION CASE NO.: 24-002994-CI-19

JOHN WILLIAM LICCIONE,

Plaintiff,

VS.

PINELLAS DEMOCRATIC EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, ET AL,

Defendants.

AMENDED ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

THIS CAUSE came before the Court for telephonic hearing on January 28, 2025, during which the Plaintiff, John William Liccione, disrupted the Court numerous times and, after being advised by the Judge to not disrupt the hearing, continued to disrupt the Court's business. The Plaintiff engaged in similar conduct during two prior telephonic hearings. The Court is hereby entering this Order to Show Cause for the Plaintiff to explain why the Court should not find the Plaintiff in direct criminal contempt pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.830 for the Plaintiff's misconduct during the hearing. Therefore, it is hereby

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:

The Plaintiff, John William Liccione, is hereby **ordered to appear in person** before the Court on:

Date/Time: Thursday, April 10, 2025, at 11:45a.m.
Judge: Thomas Ramsberger, Circuit Judge
Location: St. Petersburg Judicial Building

545 1st Avenue North, 2nd Floor, Courtroom 2A

St. Petersburg, Florida 33701

The Plaintiff will at that time provide the Court with testimony as to why he should not be found in contempt. Should the Court find the Plaintiff in contempt, then the Court will set another hearing to determine if any sanctions will be imposed upon the Plaintiff, including but not limited to, incarceration for such contempt.

FAILURE OF JOHN WILLIAM LICCIONE TO APPEAR IN COURT AT THE SCHEDULED TIME MAY RESULT IN THE COURT <u>ISSUING A WARRANT FOR HIS ARREST.</u> IF ARRESTED, YOU MAY BE HELD IN JAIL UP TO FORTY-EIGHT (48) HOURS BEFORE A HEARING IS HELD.

DONE AND ORDERED at St. Petersburg, Pinellas County, Florida, on February , 2025.

24-002994-CI 2/11/2025 3:34:16 PM Circuit Judge Thomas hamsberger 24-002994-CI 2/11/2025 3:34:16 PM

THOMAS RAMSBERGER

Circuit Judge

Copies furnished via JAWS to:
John William Liccione, Plaintiff, Pro Se
George Thurlow, Counsel for Defendants





John Liccione <iliccione@gmail.com>

RE: Liccione v. Pinellas Democratic Executive Committee, Case No. 24-002994-CI-19

George Thurlow <GThurlow@rahdertlaw.com>
To: John Liccione <jliccione@gmail.com>
Co: Teresa McCreary <TMcCreary@rahdertlaw.com>

Wed, Feb 12, 2025 at 3:11 PM

Mr. Liccione:

If you are truly unavailable on 2/18, I can also make the time on 2/17 work. Please advise as to your availability.

George Thurlow, Esq.

Associate Attorney

Rahdert & Mortimer, PLLC

535 Central Avenue

Suite 200

St. Petersburg, FL 33701

Office: (727)823-4191 ext. 409

Fax: (727)513-5600

GThurlow@RahdertLaw.com

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From: Section19 < Section19@jud6.org > Sent: Wednesday, February 12, 2025 3:09 PM

To: George Thurlow <GThurlow@rahdertlaw.com>; Teresa McCreary <TMcCreary@rahdertlaw.com>; Milestone

Reporting (Scheduling@milestonereporting.com) < Scheduling@milestonereporting.com>

Cc: John Liccione < jliccione@gmail.com>

Subject: RE: Liccione v. Pinellas Democratic Executive Committee, Case No. 24-002994-CI-19

Good afternoon Attorney Thurlow,

Thank you for your email.

This Order to Show Cause hearing needs to be scheduled sooner rather than later.

The only other dates I now have available are as follows:

M Feb. 17 11:45am

TH Feb. 20 11:45am

Please let me know as soon as possible which of these dates works best.

~Those affected by Hurricane Helene and/or Hurricane Milton, you are in our thoughts~

Please note Judge Ramsberger's telephone conference call number below.

Thank you,

Valerie McGivern

Judicial Assistant to

Circuit Judge Thomas Ramsberger

545 First Avenue North, Room 200

St. Petersburg, FL 33701

(727) 582-7874 / Section19@jud6.org

www.jud6.org

* UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE, ALL HEARINGS set before Judge Thomas Ramsberger will be conducted

by telephone conference call. *

Conference Telephone Number: 1 (425) 436-6303 Access Code: 141878#

Please state the date the motion was filed when requesting a hearing time slot via JAWS.

All counsels shall properly associate themselves in JAWS as Attorney for Plaintiff/Defendant.

Please note that Florida has a very broad public records law. Most written communications to or from state officials regarding state business are considered public records. Your e-mail message may be subject to public disclosure upon request.

From: George Thurlow < GThurlow@rahdertlaw.com>

Sent: Wednesday, February 12, 2025 12:16 PM

To: Section19 <Section19@jud6.org>; Teresa McCreary <TMcCreary@rahdertlaw.com>; Milestone Reporting

(Scheduling@milestonereporting.com) < Scheduling@milestonereporting.com>

Cc: John Liccione <iliccione@gmail.com>

Subject: RE: Liccione v. Pinellas Democratic Executive Committee, Case No. 24-002994-CI-19

Dear Ms. McGivern:

I am available February 18th but not February 19th. Mr. Liccione has advised that he is unavailable on February 18th, and has requested that the hearing be set sometime after March 11th and has advised of his unavailability for several dates in March after 3/11.

George Thurlow, Esq.

Associate Attorney

Rahdert & Mortimer, PLLC

535 Central Avenue

Suite 200

St. Petersburg, FL 33701

Office: (727)823-4191 ext. 409

Fax: (727)513-5600

GThurlow@RahdertLaw.com

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From: Section19 < Section19@jud6.org > Sent: Wednesday, February 12, 2025 10:48 AM

To: Teresa McCreary < TMcCreary@rahdertlaw.com>; Milestone Reporting (Scheduling@

milestonereporting.com) < Scheduling@milestonereporting.com>

Cc: George Thurlow <GThurlow@rahdertlaw.com>; John Liccione <jliccione@gmail.com> **Subject:** RE: Liccione v. Pinellas Democratic Executive Committee, Case No. 24-002994-Cl-19

Good morning Teresa,

Thank you for your email.

I apologize, however, I need to move the April 10, 2025, 11:45am hearing due to a conflict.

Please let me know if Mr. Liccione and Attorney Thurlow are available on one of the following dates/times:

T Feb. 18 11:45am, 1:15pm

W Feb. 19 8:45, 11:45am

I appreciate your assistance. Again, I apologize for the inconvenience.

~Those affected by Hurricane Helene and/or Hurricane Milton, you are in our thoughts~

Please note Judge Ramsberger's telephone conference call number below.

Thank you,

Valerie McGivern

Judicial Assistant to

Circuit Judge Thomas Ramsberger

545 First Avenue North, Room 200

St. Petersburg, FL 33701

(727) 582-7874 / Section19@jud6.org

www.jud6.org

* <u>UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE</u>, <u>ALL HEARINGS</u> set before Judge Thomas Ramsberger will be conducted

by telephone conference call. *

Conference Telephone Number: 1 (425) 436-6303 Access Code: 141878#

Please state the date the motion was filed when requesting a hearing time slot via JAWS.

All counsels shall properly associate themselves in JAWS as Attorney for Plaintiff/Defendant.

Please note that Florida has a very broad public records law. Most written communications to or from state officials regarding state business are considered public records. Your e-mail message may be subject to public disclosure upon request.

From: Teresa McCreary < TMcCreary@rahdertlaw.com>

Sent: Wednesday, February 12, 2025 10:08 AM

To: Milestone Reporting (Scheduling@milestonereporting.com) < Scheduling@milestonereporting.com>

Cc: George Thurlow <GThurlow@rahdertlaw.com>; John Liccione <jliccione@gmail.com>; Section19

<Section19@jud6.org>

Subject: Liccione v. Pinellas Democratic Executive Committee, Case No. 24-002994-CI-19

Please schedule a court reporter to appear in person on April 10, 2025 at 11:45 am. Attached is a copy of the Amended Order to Show Cause for the information you may require.

Note that this is an IN PERSON hearing.

Please let me know if you have any questions. Thank you.

Teresa M.O. McCreary, FRP

Florida Registered Paralegal

FBN #0292645; CTM-103885

Paralegal/Legal Assistant

to George K. Rahdert, Esquire

Rahdert & Mortimer, PLLC

535 Central Avenue

St. Petersburg, FL 33701

Phone: (727) 823-4191 X428

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Email: TMcCreary@rahdertlaw.com



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EXHIBIT I

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR PINELLAS COUNTY, FLORIDA CIVIL DIVISION

JOHN WILLIAM LICCIONE,

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VS.

Case No.: 24-003939-CI

JULIE MARCUS, in her official capacity as Pinellas County Supervisor of Elections, et. al.,

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THE COURT'S MOTION TO STAY AND ORDER

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the Court hereby moves *sua sponte* to stay the instant proceeding.

- 1. The Court has become aware that Plaintiff filed suit on August 23, 2024 in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, case number 8-24-cv-2005-SDM-NHA ("federal action").
- 2. The federal action involves many of the same defendants, some of the same claims, and the same nucleus of facts as the instant case.
 - 3. Plaintiff did not file the instant action until September 3, 2024.
- 4. "Generally, when a state lawsuit is filed that involves the same nucleus of facts as a previously filed federal lawsuit, principles of comity and the desire to avoid inconsistent results require the stay of the subsequently filed state action until the prior filed federal action has been adjudicated." Roche v. Cyrulnik, 337 So. 3d 86, 88 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021) (citations omitted). In OPKO Health, Inc. v. Lipsius, the Third District of Florida further stated the following:

Although a trial court has broad discretion to order or refuse a stay of an action pending before it, it is nonetheless an abuse of discretion to refuse to stay a subsequently filed state court action in favor of a previously filed federal action which involves the same parties and the same or substantially similar issues. This rule is based on principles of comity.

OPKO Health, Inc. v. Lipsius, 279 So. 3d 787, 791 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (citing Fla. Crushed Stone Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 632 So. 2d 217, 220 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)).

- 5. For this general rule of comity to apply, the causes of action asserted in the two cases need not be identical nor must the two actions have identical parties. *Roche*, 337 So. 3d at 88 (citations omitted).
- 6. Because Plaintiff filed his federal action prior to the instant case, the Court hereby moves to stay the instant proceeding until Plaintiff's federal action has been adjudicated.

Additionally, it is further **ORDERED** as follows:

- 1. The Court's Motion to Stay will be heard at the previously-scheduled hearing on November 12, 2024 at 3:00 P.M.
- 2. Any party who opposes the instant Motion is directed to file and serve a written response and memorandum of law opposing the instant Motion. The Court requests that any such opposition also be personally served on the undersigned by 10:00 A.M. on November 12, 2024 at section 7@jud6.org.

DONE and ORDERED in Chambers, in St. Petersburg, Pinellas County, Florida this 4th day of November, 2024.

Electronically Conformed 11/4/2024

Patricia Marcarella Patricia A. Muscarella Circuit Civil Judge

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished to the parties listed below this 4th day of November, 2024 in the manner specified below.

2		
Indicial	Assistant	

Copies furnished to:

Parties served by email

John Liccione jliccione@gmail.com Plaintiff

Kirby Z. Kreider, Esq. kkreider@pinellas.gov eservice@pinellas.gov Counsel for Defendant, Julie Marcus

George A.D. Thurlow, Esq. gthurlow@rahdertlaw.com tmccreary@rahdertlaw.com service@rahdertlaw.com Counsel for Defendant, Jennifer Griffith

James B. Lake, Esq. 1861 53rd St. S. jlake@tlolawfirm.com tgilley@tlolawfirm.com Counsel for Defendant, Cathy Salustri Loper

Parties served by U.S. mail

Mark Weinkrantz 4738 Belden Circle Palm Harbor, FL 34685 Defendant

Patrick Heinzen 1785 40th Ave. N. St. Petersburg, FL 33714 Defendant

EXHIBIT J

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR PINELLAS COUNTY, FLORIDA CIVIL DIVISION

JOHN WILLIAM LICCIONE,

Plaintiff,

vs. Case No.: 24-003939-CI

JULIE MARCUS, in her official capacity as Pinellas County Supervisor of Elections, et. al.,

Defendants	5.	

ORDER GRANTING COURT'S MOTION TO STAY

THIS CAUSE came before the Court on November 12, 2024 upon the Court's Motion to Stay ("Motion") dated November 4, 2024, and the Court, having considered the Motion, the case file, the applicable law, the argument of counsel, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, the Court hereby **FINDS** the following:

- 1. On August 23, 2024, Plaintiff filed a federal lawsuit in the Middle District of Florida, Case No.: 8:24-cv-02005-SDM-NHA ("the federal lawsuit").
- 2. On September 3, 2024, Plaintiff initiated the instant lawsuit. The federal lawsuit and the instant lawsuit contain many of the same defendants. Additionally, there is significant factual overlap between the two actions.
- 3. "Generally, when a state lawsuit is filed that involves the same nucleus of facts as a previously filed federal lawsuit, principles of comity and the desire to avoid inconsistent results require the stay of the subsequently filed state action until the prior filed federal action has been adjudicated." *Roche v. Cyrulnik*, 337 So. 3d 86, 88 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021) (citations omitted).
 - 4. It is "an abuse of discretion to refuse to stay a subsequently filed state court action

in favor of a previously filed federal action which involves the same parties and the same or substantially similar issues." *OPKO Health, Inc. v. Lipsius*, 279 So. 3d 787, 791 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (citation omitted).

- 5. For this general rule of comity to apply, the causes of action asserted in the two cases need not be identical nor must the two actions have identical parties. *Roche*, 337 So. 3d at 88 (citations omitted).
- 6. The federal lawsuit and the instant lawsuit involve the same nucleus of facts, namely allegations of election fraud by the various Defendants as to the August 20, 2024 Democratic primary election for Florida's 13th Congressional District.
- 7. Counsel for Defendants stipulated to staying the instant litigation pending the outcome of the federal lawsuit assuming the following conditions were observed: 1) claims against Defendant, JENNIFER GRIFFITH would be transferred to Section 19 and joined with Plaintiff's prior lawsuit (See Order Granting Court's Ore Tenus Motion To Consolidate); 2) all Defendants who asserted an anti-SLAPP defense did not waive their right to an expedited hearing if such is necessary upon resolution of the federal lawsuit (see section 768.295(4), Fla. Stat. (2024)).
- 8. Although Plaintiff has objected to the issuance of a stay, the Court finds that the above-provided rule of comity applies and requires the Court to stay the instant action until the federal lawsuit has been adjudicated.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED and **ADJUDGED**:

- 1. The Court's Motion is hereby **GRANTED**.
- 2. Plaintiff is required to file a copy of the final judgment for the federal lawsuit with this Court within **FIVE** (5) **DAYS** of the final judgment's date of entry.

3. The Court shall conduct a case management conference in the instant matter within **THIRTY (30) DAYS** of the entry of final judgment in the federal lawsuit to determine which, if any, of Plaintiff's claims in the instant lawsuit require adjudication by this Court. The Court shall hear any remaining anti-SLAPP defenses, if any, at said case management conference.

DONE and ORDERED in Chambers, in Clearwater, Pinellas County, Florida this ____ day of November, 2024.

Electronically Conformed 11/20/2024

Honorable Patricia A. Muscarella Circuit Civil Judge

Copies furnished to:

Parties served by email

John Liccione jliccione@gmail.com Plaintiff

Kirby Z. Kreider, Esq. kkreider@pinellas.gov eservice@pinellas.gov Counsel for Defendant, Julie Marcus

George A.D. Thurlow, Esq.
gthurlow@rahdertlaw.com
tmccreary@rahdertlaw.com
service@rahdertlaw.com
Counsel for Defendant, Jennifer Griffith

James B. Lake, Esq. jlake@tlolawfirm.com tgilley@tlolawfirm.com Counsel for Defendant, Cathy Salustri Loper

John F. McGuire, Esq. info@mcguirelawoffices.com defense@mcguirelawoffices.com rgray@mcguirelawoffices.com

Counsel for Defendant, Mark Weinkrantz

Parties served by U.S. mail

Patrick Heinzen 1785 40th Ave. N. St. Petersburg, FL 33714 Defendant

EXHIBIT K

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR PINELLAS COUNTY, FLORIDA CIVIL DIVISION

JOHN WILLIAM LICCIONE,

Plaintiff,

VS.

Case No.: 24-003939-CI
Companion Case with
Case No.: 24-002994-CI

JULIE MARCUS, in her official capacity as Pinellas County Supervisor of Elections, et. al.,

D	ef	en	d	an	ts.

ORDER GRANTING COURT'S ORE TENUS MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE *** DIRECTIONS TO THE CLERK OF COURT ***

THIS CAUSE came before the Court on November 12, 2024 upon the Court's *ore tenus* Motion to Consolidate ("Motion"), and the Court, having considered the Motion, the case file, the applicable law, the agreement of the parties, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, the Court hereby **FINDS** as follows:

- 1. This matter concerns the following cases currently pending in the Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit in and for Pinellas County, Florida: John William Liccione vs. Julie Marcus, et. al., Case No. 24-003939-CI, Section 7, the Honorable Patricia Muscarella presiding ("Section 7 Case") and John William Liccione vs. Pinellas Democratic Executive Committee, Case No. 24-002994-CI, Section 19, the Honorable Thomas Ramsberger presiding ("Section 19 Case").
- 2. Defendant, JENNIFER GRIFFITH ("Ms. Griffith") is a party in both of the aforementioned cases. The operative complaints in both cases involve considerable factual and legal overlap as to Ms. Griffith.
 - 3. Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.270(a) states the following:

Consolidation. When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.

- 4. At the case management hearing on November 12, 2024 in the Section 7 Case, the Court proposed transferring and consolidating all claims against Ms. Griffith in the Section 7 Case to the previously-filed Section 19 Case as a means of promoting judicial economy in accordance with Rule 1.270(a). The parties stipulated to the Court's proposal.
- 5. Because the Section 7 Case and the Section 19 Case involve common questions of law and fact involving Ms. Griffith, it would be an inefficient use of party and judicial resources to litigate these related disputes before different trial court judges. Both cases will proceed more efficiently with a single trial court judge presiding over the claims against Ms. Griffith. Accordingly, the efficient administration of justice requires reassignment of the Section 7 Case claims against Ms. Griffith to the Section 19 Case. Said transfer will not delay either action as the cases were filed within 65 days of each other and involve a similar procedural posture, nor will said transfer result in any substantial inconvenience, delay, or expense for the parties or the Court.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED and ADJUDGED:

- 1. The Court's Motion is hereby **GRANTED** pursuant to Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.270(a) and in accordance with the stipulation made by all parties at the November 12, 2024 hearing. Hereinafter, Section 19 of this Court shall have jurisdiction over the claims made against Ms. Griffith in the Section 7 Case. All future matters concerning claims made against Ms. Griffith shall be addressed to Section 19 of this Court.
 - 2. The Pinellas Clerk of Court is **DIRECTED** to docket this Order in both Case No.

24-003939-CI and Case No. 24-002994-CI.

DONE and ORDERED in Chambers, in Clearwater, Pinellas County, Florida this _____ day of November, 2024.

Electronically Conformed 11/20/2024

Honorable Patricia A. Muscarella

Patricia Muscarella

Circuit Civil Judge

Copies furnished to:

Parties served by email

John Liccione jliccione@gmail.com Plaintiff

Kirby Z. Kreider, Esq. kkreider@pinellas.gov eservice@pinellas.gov Counsel for Defendant, Julie Marcus

George A.D. Thurlow, Esq.

gthurlow@rahdertlaw.com tmccreary@rahdertlaw.com service@rahdertlaw.com Counsel for Defendant, Jennifer Griffith

James B. Lake, Esq.

jlake@tlolawfirm.com tgilley@tlolawfirm.com Counsel for Defendant, Cathy Salustri Loper

John F. McGuire, Esq.

info@mcguirelawoffices.com defense@mcguirelawoffices.com rgray@mcguirelawoffices.com Counsel for Defendant, Mark Weinkrantz

Parties served by U.S. mail

Patrick Heinzen 1785 40th Ave. N. St. Petersburg, FL 33714 Defendant

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR PINELLAS COUNTY, FLORIDA

CHRISTOPHER GLEASON,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO.: 24-003717-CI UCN:522024CA003717XXCICI

V.

JULIE MARCUS, in her official capacity as Pinellas County Supervisor of Elections;

DUSTIN CHASE, in his official capacity as Deputy Supervisor of Elections of Pinellas County, Florida;

MATT SMITH, in his official capacity as General Counsel for Pinellas County Supervisor of Elections;

KELLY L. VICARI, in her individual and professional capacity; JARED D. KAHN, in his individual and professional capacity; and the CANVASSING BOARD OF PINELLAS COUNTY Defendants.

AFFIDAVIT OF CHRISTOPHER GLEASON REGARDING CHAIN OF CUSTODY AND ANALYSIS FOR STATEWIDE VOTE BY MAIL EARLY VOTING LIST

STATE OF FLORIDA COUNTY OF PINELLAS

BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, personally appeared Christopher

Gleason, who, being duly sworn, deposes and says as follows:

1. Affiant's Identity:

My name is Christopher Gleason, and I am the plaintiff in the above-captioned case. I am over the age of 18, competent to make this affidavit, and have personal knowledge of the facts stated herein.

2. Purpose of Affidavit:

This affidavit is made to establish the chain of custody for the Statewide Vote By Mail Early Voting List (the "Voting List") that I obtained directly from the Florida Division of Elections at the following url:

https://countyballotfiles.floridados.gov/VoteByMailEarlyVotingReports/Reports

3. Acquisition of Voting List:

On or about and between the dates of 07/14/2024 – 09/29/2024, I personally accessed the Florida Division of Elections secure online system for authorized individuals as clearly stated in FL Stat 101.62 and FAC 1S-2.043. I used the following secure URL:

https://countyballotfiles.floridados.gov/VoteByMailEarlyVotingReports/Reports
provided to me by the Division of Elections to download the daily updates of the
Statewide Vote By Mail Early Voting List.

4. Secure Download Process:

The Florida Division of Elections provided me access to the Voting List via the following secure link

https://countyballotfiles.floridados.gov/VoteByMailEarlyVotingReports/Reports, which required my unique login credentials provided by the Division. These credentials were assigned specifically for my use as a registered recipient of the Voting List after directly registering with the State at the following url: https://countyballotfiles.floridados.gov/Account/Register

5. Receipt of Voting List:

Upon logging into the secure platform between the dates of 07/14/2024 to 09/29/2024, I downloaded the Voting List, which was provided in .txt and/or .zip format. I saved the downloaded files directly to my computer under secure conditions, ensuring that the data was not altered.

6. Handling and Storage:

After downloading the Voting List, I took immediate steps to preserve the integrity of the data. The files were securely stored on my computer, which is protected by encryption and password protection. No unauthorized individuals had access to the Voting List from the time I downloaded it until it was submitted in connection with this case.

7. Integrity of the Data:

I affirm that the Voting List downloaded from the Florida Division of Elections has not been altered, modified, or tampered with in any way. The files I obtained are in the same condition as when I downloaded them directly from the Division's secure platform.

8. Submission of Voting List:

I am submitting the Voting List as evidence in this case. The data submitted is a true and accurate copy of what I obtained from the Florida Division of Elections, and it is presented in its original, unaltered form.

9. Affirmation of Chain of Custody:

I attest that I was the sole individual who downloaded, handled, and maintained the Voting List from the time of its acquisition until its submission in this case. The chain of custody has remained intact, and there have been no unauthorized accesses or alterations to the Voting List.

10. Illegally Requested Vote By Mail Ballots/ Altered Vote By Mail Election Records

I attest that on 09/03/2024 I reviewed the Pinellas County Vote By Mail Ballot Reports.

The Pinellas County Report showed that 219,675 Vote By Mail Ballots were requested on Sunday 06/23/2024. The Pinellas County Supervisor of Elections Office was closed for business on 06/23/2024.

I attest that on 09/29/2024 I reviewed the Pinellas County Report, it showed that there were now 20 Requests for Vote By Mail Ballots requested on 06/23/2024 and that now 198,166 requests for Vote By Mail Ballots were made on 09/09/2024.

11. Public Records Requests Made To Miami Dade and Pinellas County Supervisor of Elections Offices.

I attest that Public Records Requests were made to the Pinellas County Supervisor of Elections Office for the Public Records/ Election Records documenting the Vote By Mail Ballot Requests by voters.

An estimate of 18,000 hours to complete this task was provided. To provide the responsive records, this information would take less than 5 minutes to generate.

VR Systems publicly available product documentation for Vote By Mail Reports can be readily found available on the internet at the following url:

https://content.vrsys.co/help/vf/Content/Vote by Mail/List of Vote-by-Mail Reports.htm See Exhibit 2

A request was made for the IP Addresses of the voters who made the Vote By Mail Ballot Requests on 06/23/2024 via the Supervisor of Elections Office.

See Exhibit 3

The Pinellas County Supervisor of Elections custodian of records stated that there were no "Responsive Records" related to these Vote By Mail Requests.

See Exhibit 4

This information could also be easily provided via the VR Systems Reporting

Functionality as documented on the VR Systems publicly available website url:

https://content.vrsys.co/help/vf/Content/Vote by Mail/Dialog Web Vote-by-

12. Numerous Requests For Vote By Mail Ballots Being Returned As Undeliverable Were Made

Mail Request Queue.htm . See Exhibit 5

I attest that this information was never provided in a timely manner, despite the fact that to provide this information could have easily been generated in under 5 minutes. The information related to generating and processing undeliverable vote by mail ballots is well documented at the following publicly available VR Systems website url:

https://content.vrsys.co/help/vf/Content/Voter Registration/How to Process
Undeliverable Mail%20and%20Third-Party%20Address%20Changes.htm
See Exhibit 6

FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.

Dated this 29 day of State, 2014

Christopher Gleason

Plaintiff

NOTARY ACKNOWLEDGMENT

STATE OF FLORIDA COUNTY OF PINELLAS

SWORN TO and subscribed before me this 29th day of Sept, 2024 by Christopher Gleason, who is personally known to me or who has produced FL Drivers License as identification.

Notary Public

State of Florida

My Commission Expires: [insert date]

[Seal]

CHRISTINE PETERS
Commission # HH 496653
Expires February 26, 2028

EXHIBIT 2

List of Vote-By-Mail Reports

Reports Generated as By-Products of Program Runs

- Absentee Audit Report
- Absentee Requests Created for All Elections Voters
- Ballots Issued in Deliver Ballots Run
- · Canvassing Referral Sheet
- Envelope Reader Referred Ballots by Tray
- Ordered List of Absentee Labels
- Requests Copied from Election to Election
- <u>UOCAVA Voters Not Yet Notified that their ballot has been received</u>
- UOCAVA Voters Not Yet Notified that their request has been received
- Voters Not Yet Notified of Free Access System

Reports Replaced by Vote-By-Mail Flexible Report

- · Absentee Status for All Absentee Voters
- Absentee Status for Domestic Voters
- Absentee Status for Email/Fax-Delivery Voters
- Absentee Status for Military & Civilian Overseas Voters
- Unsent Email/Fax Absentee Ballots
- FWAB Ballots Received

Reports for Generic Envelope Reader Interface

- Export Mail-Ballot Status Data
- Envelope Reader Referred Ballots by Tray Report

Reports Available on Reports Dialog

Summary Totals Reports

- Absentee Request Totals by How Requested
- · Absentee Totals for an Election
- <u>Countywide Demographic Totals</u> for Absentee and <u>Early Voting</u>
- <u>Demographic Totals by District</u>
 <u>for Absentee and Early Voting</u>
- <u>Demographic Totals by Precinct</u>
 <u>for Absentee and Early Voting</u>
- Party Totals by District for Absentee and Early Voting

Vote-By-Mail Voter Lists

- Absentee Alert Report
- Absentee Ballots Not Voted
- Absentee Ballots where Return
 Is Blocked
- Absentee Requests by Non-Family Requesters
- Active Voters Without Absentee Requests
- Canceled and Ineligible Absentee Requests
- <u>Count of Absentee Returns by</u> <u>Operator</u>
- Export Email List for an Election
- FPCA and All-Elections Voters
- In-Office Absentee Voters
- <u>Line Printer Absentee Status</u> <u>Report</u>
- Vote-By-Mail Flexible Report
- Voters Reactivated by Absentee Request
- Voters Voting Absentee Ballots
- Voters Voting Both Advance and Absentee Ballots
- <u>Voters Who Returned Absentee</u> <u>Ballots</u>

Vote-By-Mail Ballot Reports

- Absentee Ballot Balance Sheet
- Absentee Ballots Issued by Ballot Style
- Absentee Ballots Issued by Operator
- Affidavit to Cure Unsigned Ballots
- Ballots Returned Temporarily Away
- Count of Absentee Requests by Ballot Style
- <u>Count of In-Office Absentee Ballots</u> <u>Issued by Ballot Style</u>
- Export of Returned Absentee Ballot by Batch Number
- Pending Web Absentee Requests
- Replacement Ballots Issued
- Returned Absentee Ballots by Batch Number
- <u>Unreviewed and Referred Absentee</u>
 <u>Ballots</u>

Vote-By-Mail Audit Reports

- Absentee Activity Dump
- Absentee Ballot Style Changes
- Absentee Request Activity
- Possible Voting Irregularities
- Referred Absentee Ballots

Fraud Detection Reports

- Active Cases
- Approved Addresses
- Blocked Vote-By-Mail Requests
- Inactive Cases
- Questionable Web Requests for an Election

Relia-Vote Reports

- Relia-Vote Missing Valid Envelopes
 Report
- · Relia-Vote Status Report



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EXHIBIT 3

PLAINTIFF'S FIRST REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS

To Defendant: Julie Marcus

From: Plaintiff John Liccione

Case No.: 24-003939-CI, John Liccione vs Julie Marcus, et al

Plaintiff John Liccione hereby submits to Defendant Julie Marcus, Pinellas County Supervisor of Elections, this first Request for Production of Documents.

All non-privileged computer session and transaction logs and reports which captured and stored the computer forensic details, metadata, and voter data which together serve to document the submittal of vote-by-mail ballot requests to Pinellas County Supervisor of Elections' (SOE) computer systems directly over the Internet or otherwise, or indirectly through the computer systems of the SOE's contractors, or, loaded via physical insertion of removable storage devices (i.e., thumb drives, portable hard drives), solely on the date of June 23, 2024: Said metadata and data to include but not be limited to the following:

- 1. The source IP addresses of all vote-by-mail ballot requester user sessions and submittal transactions that resulted in the successful or unsuccessful submittal of vote-by-mail ballot requests.
- 2. The names, and addresses of the submitters.
- 3. The type of web client used to submit the requests.
- 4. The date/time of submittal.
- 5. The names and versions of each software application used to receive, process, store, and report out the above ballot requests, as was fielded in production on the date of June 23, 2024, and any subsequent versions the applications may have been updated to or roll-ed back from after June 23, 2024. SOE and contractor firewall logs which captured and recorded the above vote-by-mail ballot submittal sessions.

If Defendant Marcus or any SOE vendor working for SOE, such as VR Systems, claims privilege over any such data as legal grounds for not complying with this request, state the nature and legal grounds for the privilege and the reason which such information cannot be provided if maintained under court seal.

Respectfully submitted,

John W Liccione

Plaintiff, Pro Se

443-698-8156

jliccione@gmail.com

September 11, 2024

EXHIBIT 4



John Liccione <john@thecrabber.com>

Public Records Request: 2024-392 from John Liccione

5 messages

publicrecordsrequest < publicrecordsrequest@votepinellas.gov>
Reply-To: "McKnight-Taylor, Ashley" <ataylor@votepinellas.gov>
To: "john@thecrabber.com" <john@thecrabber.com>

Fri, Aug 30, 2024 at 7:33 PM

Dear John Liccione,

This will acknowledge receipt of your public records request. We are reviewing our records to determine if there are any records responsive to your request. Once this has been determined, we will provide either the records, or for more extensive requests, an estimate of the cost to provide these records.

You requested the following records:

"A .csv file or excel spreadsheet report showing the source IP address of each and every individual who submitted an absentee ballot request to the Pinellas Supervisor of Elections over the Internet on June 23, 2024. The report need not provide any personally identifiable information, just the following 2 columns: (1) Date/Time of submission; (2) Source IP Address of submitter. It is noted that this type of metadata is typically available as a cybersecurity standard practice in web server logs, firewall logs, cloud service provider (e.g., Cloudflare) reports, and other off-the-shelf IT logging and reporting systems. It would typically take an IT person with proper access credentials less than 30 minutes to generate it and export it to a csv or Excel file."

To inquire about the status of your public records request, please call 727-464-8683.

Thank you,

Communications Department, Pinellas County Supervisor of Elections Office


John Liccione <john@thecrabber.com>
To: Christopher Gleason <GleasonForPinellas@gmail.com>

Fri, Aug 30, 2024 at 7:48 PM

Hi Chris.

I just submitted this laser-focused record request on source IP addresses of 6/23 ballot-requesters to the SOE in my persona as CEO of my new media company, "The Crabber," which I just incorporated on 8/15/24.

John Liccione
Founder and CEO
The Crabber News, LLC
thecrabber.com
john@thecrabber.com



[Quoted text hidden]

Smith, Matt <masmith@votepinellas.gov>

To: "john@thecrabber.com" <john@thecrabber.com>

Cc: publicrecordsrequest <publicrecordsrequest@votepinellas.gov>

Tue, Sep 17, 2024 at 10:07 AM

Mr. Liccione.

We have no records responsive to your request.

Thanks.

Matt Smith

General Counsel

Representing Julie Marcus, Supervisor of Elections

13001 Starkey Rd., Largo, FL 33773

(727) 464-5751

masmith@votepinellas.gov

Find us on Facebook ~ Follow us @VotePinellas

Under Florida law, email addresses are public records. If you do not want your email address released in response to a public-records request, do not send electronic mail to this entity. Instead, contact this office by phone or in writing. -- F.S. 668.6076

Conforme a la legislación de Florida, las direcciones de correo electrónico son registros públicos. Si no desea que su correo electrónico se divulgue como respuesta a una solicitud de registros públicos, no envie un correo electrónico a esta entidad. En su lugar, póngase en contacto con esta oficina por teléfono o por escrito. - F.S.

From: publicrecordsrequest >publicrecordsrequest@votepinellas.gov

Sent: Friday, August 30, 2024 7:33 PM

To: john@thecrabber.com

Subject: Public Records Request: 2024-392 from John Liccione

Dear John Liccione,

[Quoted text hidden]

John Liccione <john@thecrabber.com>

To: "Smith, Matt" <masmith@votepinellas.gov>

Cc: publicrecordsrequest <publicrecordsrequest@votepinellas.gov>

Mr Smith,

Tue, Sep 17, 2024 at 6:33 PM

I'd like to schedule a meeting with you and whomever on PSOE staff you deem appropriate on this records request at your earliest convenience.

Please let me know if you're willing to discuss this matter at your offices and if so, when.

Regards,

John Liccione
[Quoted text hidden]

Smith, Matt <masmith@votepinellas.gov>
To: John Liccione <john@thecrabber.com>

Wed, Sep 18, 2024 at 1:58 PM

Mr. Liccione -

As we have provided you with a response to your public records request, we consider the request complete and the matter closed.

Since you have made this public records request an issue in your current lawsuit against this office (24-003939-CI), please refer all future correspondence regarding this matter to our litigation attorneys.

Thank you,

Matt Smith

General Counsel

Representing Julie Marcus, Supervisor of Elections

13001 Starkey Rd., Largo, FL 33773

(727) 464-5751

masmith@votepinellas.gov

Find us on Facebook ~ Follow us @VotePinellas

Under Florida law, email addresses are public records. If you do not want your email address released in response to a public-records request, do not send electronic mail to this entity. Instead, contact this office by phone or in writing. — F.S. 668.6076

Conforme a la legislación de Florida, las direcciones de correo electrónico son registros públicos. Si no desea que su correo electrónico se divulgue como respuesta a una solicitud de registros públicos, no envie un correo electrónico a esta entidad. En su lugar, póngase en contacto con esta oficina por teléfono o por escrito. -- F.S. 668.6076


[Quoted text hidden]

EXHIBIT 5

Web Vote-By-Mail Request Queue

To access: Vote By Mail > Process Web Requests

This dialog lists the Vote-By-Mail requests that voters have submitted using the Absentee/Mail Ballot Request Form on your website.



Initially, the requests are ordered by when they were added to the queue (that is, the *Date Added* column) and respective of the filters at the bottom of the dialog.

- Select to display Single and All Elections, or limit the grid display to only All Elections or only Single Elections.
- Leave the default Max number to display in the queue, which is 500 requests, or change the selection.

Note:

- Changing the Max setting to a significantly greater number may affect the system's response time to load and also re-load (after processing a request and returning to the grid) requests.
- The system retains changes to the Max setting. The next time you return to the dialog, your last setting remains in effect.

To sort by a different column or change the sort order (ascending or descending), click any column header.

For an overview of the Process Web Requests feature, see <u>About Vote-By-Mail Requests Submitted Online</u>. To learn how to process both single and all-elections requests, review <u>Process Vote-By-Mail Requests Submitted Through Your Website</u>.

Note: If your county uses <u>Vote-By-Mail Fraud Detection</u>, web requests are intercepted before they enter the queue and are not released into the queue

until the Fraud Detection program is run.

Note: to VR Tower Counties In Website Maintenance, you can create a CSV list of request submitted on the website during a specified time period. Use the list to confirm that email notifications are going to the right recipients in the elections office and to verify that web requests are entering the request queue.



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EXHIBIT 6

Process Undeliverable Mail and Third-Party Address Changes

This topic describes how to process undeliverable postal items and notices of a <u>voter address</u> <u>change from third-party</u> agencies.

Important:

For Undeliverable Mail Ballots—

- Do not process an undeliverable Vote-By-Mail ballot as undeliverable mail unless the package contains a change-of-address notice from the Postal Service.
- For undeliverable ballots without a third-party address change, follow the instructions in <u>Process an Undeliverable Vote-By-Mail Ballot</u>.
- For ballots with an address change, refer the return as described in <u>Process an Undeliverable Vote-By-Mail Ballot</u>. Then, <u>process the package</u> <u>as undeliverable mail</u> with a third-party address change, as described below.

When the Postal Service is unable to deliver mail (other than mail ballots) to a voter and returns it to your office, it should be processed as undeliverable mail. In addition to undeliverable postal items, the following items should also be processed as undeliverable mail:

- Jury notices with changes of address
- Changes of address from an NCOA vendor that your county is not processing using the automated NCOA processing facility provided in Voter Focus.
- HSMV lists of voters who have surrendered their Florida driver license in another state and have provided a new out-of-state address.

These items, plus undeliverable mail that includes a change-of-address notice, fall into the category of third-party address changes. Depending on the type of address change (residential or mailing, in-county, or out-of-county) the proper notice will be scheduled to be sent to the voter requesting confirmation of the address change. A log is posted to the voter's audit noting the address change and the notice(s) scheduled.

The processing of undeliverable mail for which there is no change of address schedules the voter to receive a Final Notice and adds an entry to their audit log that the notice is scheduled. When the notice is sent, a record of that event is added to the Comms tab in the voter's record. Should a Final Notice be returned as undeliverable, no further communications are scheduled for the voter, and the voter will be placed in the queue of voters who are <u>ready to be made Inactive</u>. Should the voter subsequently request a mail

ballot or cast a ballot during an election, Voter Focus will remove them from the Inactive queue.

If a voter previously made an all-elections or FPCA Vote-By-Mail request, processing undeliverable mail with no change of address or an out-of-state address automatically triggers the cancellation of any outstanding Vote-By-Mail requests for future elections (unless a ballot has already been delivered) and sets the expiration date of the all-elections/FPCA request to today's date. The process also schedules a Cancelled Requests Notice to be sent to the voter.

To process undeliverable mail or a third-party address change:

- 1. Go to VOTER REGISTRATION > Record Undeliverable Mail.
- 2. Do one of the following:
 - Scan First enabled—On the Process Undeliverable Mail dialog, double-click on the desired row from the Images grid. The Find a Voter and Batch Images dialogs open. You can clip the signature area of the image, if one exists, to index a copy of the voter's signature. Otherwise, continue to the next step.
 - Scan First disabled—On the Voter Management dialog, accept today's date or enter an earlier date when the mail (or jury notice) was returned to your office and click OK. (The Comms tab in the voter's record will show this date in the Date column.) The Find a Voter dialog opens.
- 3. If you are working with a bar code wand, wand the bar code to open the voter's record; otherwise, do a local search by name. The **Undeliverable Mail** dialog opens with the voter's information in the fields.



4. Check the date in the Last Activity Date field and determine if you have had activity from this voter since you received the mail or jury notice in the office. If the date in Last Activity Date is earlier than the date the item arrived in the office, continue with the next step.

If the date in the **Last Activity Date** field is later than the date the item arrived, do not process the item, because the voter has either contacted the elections office or voted since you received it. Click **Close** to complete the procedure.

- If your county wants the note Address Update Required to appear with the voter's name on subsequent precinct registers (and EVID screens), select Change Status to "Address Update Required".
- 6. In the Mail Type box, select the type of item you are processing. You can toggle the list of options between Classic Mail Types and Voter Mail Types. The option Other Mail can be any item not covered by the other options, such as a sample ballot or a mail ballot. The selection in this box is sticky for this undeliverable mail session; once you select a mail type, it remains selected for the next voter unless


you change it. This lets you quickly process a batch of similar items for different voters.

Note:

- If the item is a combo card, select Address Change Notice as the mail type.
- If the voter was previously sent a Notice of Potential Ineligibility, the notice will also be listed in the Mail Type box.

7. Click one of the following:

- No Address Change—If the undeliverable item has no change-of-address notice. You will see the message An Address Final Notice will be sent to the voter. Click OK to finish processing the item. You can now restart this procedure to process undeliverable mail for another voter.
- Forwarding Address—If the item shows a change of address for the voter. If the mail type you selected does not match with sent mail records in the system, a message displays.



Verify that you have the right voter and have selected the correct type of mail item. If the mail was truly sent without being recorded in the system, click **OK** to continue processing the undeliverable mail.

Voter doesn't have a mailing address:

Voter has a mailing address:

8. When you finish recording undeliverable mail, go to Printing > Notices Queue to print the notices. For mail merge documents, mailing labels may also be printed.

You can view details about sent notices and temporary forwarding addresses from the Audit and Comms tabs in voter records,

Undeliverable mail processed by each user is included in the totals in the Operator Additions and Changes report.



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
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EXHIBIT 5

Web Vote-By-Mail Request Queue

To access: Vote By Mail > Process Web Requests

This dialog lists the Vote-By-Mail requests that voters have submitted using the Absentee/Mail Ballot Request Form on your website.



Initially, the requests are ordered by when they were added to the queue (that is, the *Date Added* column) and respective of the filters at the bottom of the dialog.

- Select to display Single and All Elections, or limit the grid display to only All Elections or only Single Elections.
- Leave the default Max number to display in the queue, which is 500 requests, or change the selection.

Note:

- Changing the Max setting to a significantly greater number may affect the system's response time to load and also re-load (after processing a request and returning to the grid) requests.
- The system retains changes to the Max setting. The next time you return to the dialog, your last setting remains in effect.

To sort by a different column or change the sort order (ascending or descending), click any column header.

For an overview of the Process Web Requests feature, see <u>About Vote-By-Mail Requests Submitted Online</u>. To learn how to process both single and all-elections requests, review <u>Process Vote-By-Mail Requests Submitted Through Your Website</u>.

Note: If your county uses <u>Vote-By-Mail Fraud Detection</u>, web requests are intercepted before they enter the queue and are not released into the queue

until the Fraud Detection program is run.

Note: to VR Tower Counties In Website Maintenance, you can create a CSV list of request submitted on the website during a specified time period. Use the list to confirm that email notifications are going to the right recipients in the elections office and to verify that web requests are entering the request queue.



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EXHIBIT 6

Process Undeliverable Mail and Third-Party Address Changes

This topic describes how to process undeliverable postal items and notices of a <u>voter address</u> <u>change from third-party</u> agencies.

Important:

For Undeliverable Mail Ballots—

- Do not process an undeliverable Vote-By-Mail ballot as undeliverable mail unless the package contains a change-of-address notice from the Postal Service.
- For undeliverable ballots without a third-party address change, follow the instructions in <u>Process an Undeliverable Vote-By-Mail Ballot</u>.
- For ballots with an address change, refer the return as described in <u>Process an Undeliverable Vote-By-Mail Ballot</u>. Then, <u>process the package</u> <u>as undeliverable mail</u> with a third-party address change, as described below.

When the Postal Service is unable to deliver mail (other than mail ballots) to a voter and returns it to your office, it should be processed as undeliverable mail. In addition to undeliverable postal items, the following items should also be processed as undeliverable mail:

- Jury notices with changes of address
- Changes of address from an NCOA vendor that your county is not processing using the automated NCOA processing facility provided in Voter Focus.
- HSMV lists of voters who have surrendered their Florida driver license in another state and have provided a new out-of-state address.

These items, plus undeliverable mail that includes a change-of-address notice, fall into the category of third-party address changes. Depending on the type of address change (residential or mailing, in-county, or out-of-county) the proper notice will be scheduled to be sent to the voter requesting confirmation of the address change. A log is posted to the voter's audit noting the address change and the notice(s) scheduled.

The processing of undeliverable mail for which there is no change of address schedules the voter to receive a Final Notice and adds an entry to their audit log that the notice is scheduled. When the notice is sent, a record of that event is added to the Comms tab in the voter's record. Should a Final Notice be returned as undeliverable, no further communications are scheduled for the voter, and the voter will be placed in the queue of voters who are <u>ready to be made Inactive</u>. Should the voter subsequently request a mail

ballot or cast a ballot during an election, Voter Focus will remove them from the Inactive queue.

If a voter previously made an all-elections or FPCA Vote-By-Mail request, processing undeliverable mail with no change of address or an out-of-state address automatically triggers the cancellation of any outstanding Vote-By-Mail requests for future elections (unless a ballot has already been delivered) and sets the expiration date of the all-elections/FPCA request to today's date. The process also schedules a Cancelled Requests Notice to be sent to the voter.

To process undeliverable mail or a third-party address change:

- 1. Go to VOTER REGISTRATION > Record Undeliverable Mail.
- 2. Do one of the following:
 - Scan First enabled—On the Process Undeliverable Mail dialog, double-click on the desired row from the Images grid. The Find a Voter and Batch Images dialogs open. You can clip the signature area of the image, if one exists, to index a copy of the voter's signature. Otherwise, continue to the next step.
 - Scan First disabled—On the Voter Management dialog, accept today's date or enter an earlier date when the mail (or jury notice) was returned to your office and click OK. (The Comms tab in the voter's record will show this date in the Date column.) The Find a Voter dialog opens.
- 3. If you are working with a bar code wand, wand the bar code to open the voter's record; otherwise, do a local search by name. The **Undeliverable Mail** dialog opens with the voter's information in the fields.



4. Check the date in the Last Activity Date field and determine if you have had activity from this voter since you received the mail or jury notice in the office. If the date in Last Activity Date is earlier than the date the item arrived in the office, continue with the next step.

If the date in the **Last Activity Date** field is later than the date the item arrived, do not process the item, because the voter has either contacted the elections office or voted since you received it. Click **Close** to complete the procedure.

- If your county wants the note Address Update Required to appear with the voter's name on subsequent precinct registers (and EVID screens), select Change Status to "Address Update Required".
- 6. In the Mail Type box, select the type of item you are processing. You can toggle the list of options between Classic Mail Types and Voter Mail Types. The option Other Mail can be any item not covered by the other options, such as a sample ballot or a mail ballot. The selection in this box is sticky for this undeliverable mail session; once you select a mail type, it remains selected for the next voter unless


you change it. This lets you quickly process a batch of similar items for different voters.

Note:

- If the item is a combo card, select Address Change Notice as the mail type.
- If the voter was previously sent a Notice of Potential Ineligibility, the notice will also be listed in the Mail Type box.

7. Click one of the following:

- No Address Change—If the undeliverable item has no change-of-address notice. You will see the message An Address Final Notice will be sent to the voter. Click OK to finish processing the item. You can now restart this procedure to process undeliverable mail for another voter.
- Forwarding Address—If the item shows a change of address for the voter. If the mail type you selected does not match with sent mail records in the system, a message displays.



Verify that you have the right voter and have selected the correct type of mail item. If the mail was truly sent without being recorded in the system, click **OK** to continue processing the undeliverable mail.

Voter doesn't have a mailing address:

Voter has a mailing address:

8. When you finish recording undeliverable mail, go to Printing > Notices Queue to print the notices. For mail merge documents, mailing labels may also be printed.

You can view details about sent notices and temporary forwarding addresses from the Audit and Comms tabs in voter records,

Undeliverable mail processed by each user is included in the totals in the Operator Additions and Changes report.



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EXHIBIT M

Affidavit of Christopher Gleason dated 2/14/2025

SWORN STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER GLEASON

STATE OF FLORIDA COUNTY OF PINELLAS

- I, **Christopher Gleason**, declare under penalty of perjury that the following is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief:
 - 1. I have firsthand knowledge of the facts stated herein.
 - 2. I was a candidate for Pinellas County Supervisor of Elections in 2024.
 - 3. I applied to the Florida Division of Elections for an account on their vote-by-mail (VBM) ballot records portal and was granted access to it in June, 2024.
 - 4. On multiple dates, I logged into the State portal https://countyballotfiles.floridados.gov/Account/Login?ReturnUrl=%2FVoteByMailEarlyVotingReports%2FReports on my computer and downloaded the VBM Ballot Request comma-delimited text (.txt) files that the State had published on a daily basis during the campaign.
 - 5. I imported the .txt file into an Excel spreadsheet and discovered a massive spike of over 219,000 VBM ballot requests in Pinellas County on Sunday, June 23, 2024.
 - 6. I further discovered that 97 percent of the VBM ballot requests recorded on June 23, 2024, showed as having no (N) Social Security number (last 4 digits) and no (N) driver's license number attached to the request.
 - 7. This discovery formed the basis for part of my election fraud and contest of elections lawsuits, Case No. 24-003717 and Case No. 24-003995.
 - 8. On February 13, 2024, I conducted a search on the names of judges Thomas Ramsberger and Patricia Muscarella. I discovered that the State's data showed that both judges were among the over 219,000 VBM ballot requests recorded as received on Sunday, June 23, 2024. Additionally, the data indicated that the VBM ballot requests submitted under the voter ID's and names of both judges also showed as having no (N) Social Security number and no (N) driver's license number attached to the request.
 - 9. Furthermore, the personally protected individual information of both judges
 Thomas Ramsberger and Patricia Muscarella were redacted as required under
 Florida Statutes and the Florida Rules of Procedure. This report generated by the

State of Florida was the same report that I had submitted to the court as evidence. Judge Muscarella ruled that every single exhibit in the case was to be sealed based on the fraudulently filed motion by Pinellas County Attorneys Jared Kahn and Kelly Vaccari.

10. I notified John Liccione of these facts on the same day, February 13, 2024.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Florida that the foregoing is true and correct.

DATED this 14th day of February, 2025.

/s/ Christopher Gleason

Christopher Gleason

Affiant

EXHIBIT N

Affidavit of John Siamas dated 02/18/2025

AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN SIAMAS

REGARDING CHAIN OF CUSTODY FOR STATEWIDE VOTE-BY-MAIL REPORT AND THE IRREGULARITES OBSERVED WITH THE DATA

STATE OF FLORIDA

COUNTY OF PINELLAS

BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, personally appeared John Siamas, who, being duly sworn, deposes and says as follows:

Affiant's Identity

1. I, John Siamas, was a Republican candidate for the Florida State Sente District 21 Primary Election held on August 20th, 2024. I am over 18 and competent to make this affidavit and have personal knowledge of the facts stated herein.

Purpose of Affidavit

2. This affidavit is made to establish the chain of custody for the Statewide Vote-By-Mail (the "VBM Report") that I obtained directly from the Florida Division of Elections at the following url:

https://countyballotfiles.floridados.gov/VoteByMailEarlyVotingReports/Reports

Acquisition of Voting List

3. I personally accessed the Florida Division of Elections secure online system for authorized individuals as clearly stated in FL Stat 101.62 and FAC 1S-2.043. I used the following secure URL

https://countyballotfiles.floridados.gov/VoteByMailEarlyVotingReports/Reports
provided to me by the Division of Elections to download the daily updates of the Statewide
VBM Report.

Secure Download Process

4. The Florida Division of Elections provided me with access to the Voting List via the following secure link

https://countyballotfiles.floridados.gov/VoteByMailEarlyVotingReports/Reports,
which required my unique login credentials provided by the Division. These credentials were
assigned specifically for my use as a registered recipient of the Voting List after directly
registering with the State at the following url:

https://countyballotfiles.floridados.gov/Account/Register

Receipt of Voting List

5. Upon logging into the secure platform August 22, 2024, I downloaded the VBM Report file name "VBM_43887_08212024_080337289.txt" compressed and wrapped within the "VBM_43887_08212024.zip", file the State had published. I saved the files directly to my computer using industry-standard cybersecurity best practices, ensuring that the data was not altered, and I burned the file to immutable storage media – a write once read-only DVD disk.

Handling and Storage

6. After downloading the VMB Report, I took immediate steps to preserve the integrity of the data. The files were securely stored on my computer and external hard drive, which is protected by encryption and password protection. No unauthorized individuals had access to the VBM Report from the time I downloaded it until the date of this affidavit and is now submitted in connection with this case.


Integrity of the Data


7. I affirm that the VBM Report downloaded from the Florida Division of Elections has not been altered, modified, or tampered with in any way. The files I obtained are in the same

condition as when I downloaded them directly from the Division's secure platform and I have burned the file to immutable storage media (a DVD).

Irregularities and Anomalies with the Vote-By-Mail Ballots

- 8. Here are the following anomalies and irregularities in the vote-by-mail ballots and the system implemented to administer the vote-by-mail ballots:
- 9. When observing the VBM Report request data as of August 22, 2024, provided by the Florida Division of Elections for the primary elections, I noticed two very unusual outliers in the requests made. Here is a visualization of the daily requests made across the entire state in 2024:





■ DAD ■ PIN

10. The two extreme outliers represent the counties of Pinellas and Miami-Dade. Pinellas county received 219,675 vote-by-mail ballot requests on Sunday June 23, 2024, and Miami-Dade received 179,358 vote-by-mail ballot requests on Wednesday June 26, 2024. The following is a factual analysis of these anomalies.

Pinellas County

- 11. On Sunday June 23, 2024, there were 219,675 vote-by-mail ballots requested from the Pinellas County Supervisor of Elections office. Of those 219,675 vote-by-mail requests, according to the VBM Report dated August 21, 2024, provided by the State, 219,628 (99%) did not provide a Driver's License or Last 4 of SSN as part of the request. This is indicated by a "N" designator in the columns for the "FLDL/StateID" and "VoterSSN4" in the report.
- 12. Among the listed individuals who are listed as not having a "N" designator in the columns for the "FLDL/StateID" and "VoterSSN4" in the report are Patricia A Muscarella and Thomas M Ramsberger. Both are judges in the Sixth Judicial Circuit of Pasco and Pinellas Counties. See **EXHIBIT 01** with redacted screen shots of the two names.

Miami-Dade County

13. On Wednesday June 26, 2024, there were 179,358 vote-by-mail ballots that were recorded as having been requested at Miami-Dade County Supervisor of Elections office. Of those, 178,848 ballots (99.7%) did not provide a Driver's License or Last 4 of SSN as part of the request. This is indicated by a "N" designator in the columns for the "FLDL/StateID" and "VoterSSN4" in the report.

EXHIBIT 01 Redacted Screen Shots of the Two Names




EXHIBIT O

2nd DCA Order Denying Writ of Prohibition

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT

1700 N. Tampa Street, Suite 300, Tampa FL 33602

February 12, 2025

JOHN WILLIAM LICCIONE, PETITIONER(S)

CASE NO.: 2D2025-0297 L.T. No.: 24-002994-CI

V.

PINELLAS DEMOCRATIC EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, MICHAEL JOHN SHEROSKY, JENNIFER W. GRIFFITH, RESPONDENT(S).

BY ORDER OF THE COURT:

The petition for writ of prohibition is denied.

SILBERMAN, MORRIS, and LABRIT, JJ., Concur.

I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing is a true copy of the original court order.

Many Elizabeth Kuenzel, Clerk

2D2025-0297 2/12/25



JAR

Served:

PINELLAS CLERK JOHN WILLIAM LICCIONE HON. THOMAS M. RAMSBERGER GEORGE ALBERT DOYLE THURLOW





John Liccione <jliccione@gmail.com>

Set CMC Rer: Liccione v. Pinellas Democratic Executive Committee, Case No. 24-002994-CI-19

Section19 <Section19@jud6.org>

Tue, Feb 18, 2025 at 8:39 AM

To: Teresa McCreary <TMcCreary@rahdertlaw.com>, George Thurlow <GThurlow@rahdertlaw.com> Cc: John Liccione <jliccione@gmail.com>

Good morning Teresa,

Judge Ramsberger would like a telephone conference call Case Management Conference schedule regarding the above matter.

The following time slots are available:

M	Feb. 24	9:45am, 2:30pm
Т	Feb. 25	10:30am, 3:30pm
W	Feb. 26	9:15am, 2:45, 3:30pm
M	March 3	10:30am

Teresa, would you please let me know as soon as possible which of the above time slots clears with Mr. Liccione and Attorney Thurlow.

Please note Judge Ramsberger's telephone conference call number below.

Thank you,

Valerie McGivern

Judicial Assistant to

Circuit Judge Thomas Ramsberger

545 First Avenue North, Room 200

St. Petersburg, FL 33701

(727) 582-7874 / Section19@jud6.org

www.jud6.org

by telephone conference call. *

Conference Telephone Number: 1 (425) 436-6303 Access Code: 141878#

[~]Those affected by Hurricane Helene and/or Hurricane Milton, you are in our thoughts~

^{* &}lt;u>UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE</u>, <u>ALL HEARINGS</u> set before Judge Thomas Ramsberger will be conducted

Please state the date the motion was filed when requesting a hearing time slot via JAWS.

All counsels shall properly associate themselves in JAWS as Attorney for Plaintiff/Defendant.

Please note that Florida has a very broad public records law. Most written communications to or from state officials regarding state business are considered public records. Your e-mail message may be subject to public disclosure upon request.

From: Section19

Sent: Friday, February 14, 2025 4:19 PM

To: Teresa McCreary < TMcCreary@rahdertlaw.com>; George Thurlow < GThurlow@rahdertlaw.com>

Cc: John Liccione <iliccione@gmail.com>

Subject: RE: Liccione v. Pinellas Democratic Executive Committee, Case No. 24-002994-CI-19

Good afternoon Teresa,

I apologize for the delay in my reply. The OTSC hearing will <u>not</u> go forward on Monday, February 17, 2025 or anytime next week.

I will coordinate with you soon regarding a new hearing date.

Thank you for your assistance.

Have a wonderful weekend!

~Those affected by Hurricane Helene and/or Hurricane Milton, you are in our thoughts~

Please note Judge Ramsberger's telephone conference call number below.

Thank you,

Valerie McGivern

Judicial Assistant to

Circuit Judge Thomas Ramsberger

545 First Avenue North, Room 200

St. Petersburg, FL 33701

(727) 582-7874 / Section19@jud6.org

www.jud6.org

* UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE, ALL HEARINGS set before Judge Thomas Ramsberger will be conducted

by telephone conference call. *

Conference Telephone Number: 1 (425) 436-6303 Access Code: 141878#

Please state the date the motion was filed when requesting a hearing time slot via JAWS.

All counsels shall properly associate themselves in JAWS as Attorney for Plaintiff/Defendant.

Please note that Florida has a very broad public records law. Most written communications to or from state officials regarding state business are considered public records. Your e-mail message may be subject to public disclosure upon request.

From: Teresa McCreary < TMcCreary@rahdertlaw.com>

Sent: Friday, February 14, 2025 3:58 PM

To: Section19 <Section19@jud6.org>; George Thurlow <GThurlow@rahdertlaw.com>

Cc: John Liccione <jliccione@gmail.com>

Subject: Liccione v. Pinellas Democratic Executive Committee, Case No. 24-002994-CI-19

Ms. McGivern:

Please advise if we should expect an Order for the Order to Show Cause Hearing on Monday.

Teresa M.O. McCreary, FRP

Florida Registered Paralegal

FBN #0292645; CTM-103885

Paralegal/Legal Assistant

Phone: (727) 823-4191 X428

EFax: 7275135600@hostmyfax.com

Fax: (727) 823-6189

Email: TMcCreary@rahdertlaw.com

From: Section19 < Section19@jud6.org>
Sent: Thursday, February 13, 2025 4:21 PM

To: George Thurlow <GThurlow@rahdertlaw.com>; Teresa McCreary <TMcCreary@rahdertlaw.com>

Cc: John Liccione <iliccione@gmail.com>

Subject: RE: FW: Liccione v. Pinellas Democratic Executive Committee, Case No. 24-002994-CI-19

Good afternoon Attorney Thurlow,

Thank you for your email and assistance.

I will discuss this matter with Judge Ramsberger as soon as he takes a recess from trial.

I will reply again as soon as possible.

~Those affected by Hurricane Helene and/or Hurricane Milton, you are in our thoughts~

Please note Judge Ramsberger's telephone conference call number below.

Thank you,

Valerie McGivern

Judicial Assistant to

Circuit Judge Thomas Ramsberger

545 First Avenue North, Room 200

St. Petersburg, FL 33701

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Conference Telephone Number: 1 (425) 436-6303 Access Code: 141878#

Please state the date the motion was filed when requesting a hearing time slot via JAWS.

All counsels shall properly associate themselves in JAWS as Attorney for Plaintiff/Defendant.

Please note that Florida has a very broad public records law. Most written communications to or from state officials regarding state business are considered public records. Your e-mail message may be subject to public disclosure upon request.

From: George Thurlow < GThurlow@rahdertlaw.com>

Sent: Thursday, February 13, 2025 4:08 PM

To: Section19 <Section19@jud6.org>; Teresa McCreary <TMcCreary@rahdertlaw.com>

Cc: John Liccione < jliccione@gmail.com>

Subject: RE: FW: Liccione v. Pinellas Democratic Executive Committee, Case No. 24-002994-CI-19

Dear Ms. McGivern:

I can attend at any of those times on Monday February 17th.

To supplement my morning conversation which my last email relayed, I once again called Mr. Liccione this afternoon to confirm whether he was available, and he declined to confirm his availability.

George Thurlow, Esq.

Associate Attorney

Rahdert & Mortimer, PLLC

535 Central Avenue

Suite 200

St. Petersburg, FL 33701

Office: (727)823-4191 ext. 409

Fax: (727)513-5600

GThurlow@RahdertLaw.com

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From: Section19 < Section19@jud6.org>
Sent: Thursday, February 13, 2025 12:15 PM

To: George Thurlow <GThurlow@rahdertlaw.com>; Teresa McCreary <TMcCreary@rahdertlaw.com>

Cc: John Liccione <iliccione@gmail.com>

Subject: RE: FW: Liccione v. Pinellas Democratic Executive Committee, Case No. 24-002994-CI-19

Good afternoon Attorney Thurlow,

As I previously stated, this Order to Show Cause hearing needs to be heard sooner, rather than later.

The Order to Show Cause hearing will be scheduled for Monday, February 17, 2025 at 11:00, 11:15, 11:30 or 11:45am.

Please let me know as soon as possible which time works best for all parties.

~Those affected by Hurricane Helene and/or Hurricane Milton, you are in our thoughts~

Please note Judge Ramsberger's telephone conference call number below.

Thank you,

Valerie McGivern

Judicial Assistant to

Circuit Judge Thomas Ramsberger

545 First Avenue North, Room 200

St. Petersburg, FL 33701

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by telephone conference call. *

Conference Telephone Number: 1 (425) 436-6303 Access Code: 141878#

Please state the date the motion was filed when requesting a hearing time slot via JAWS.

All counsels shall properly associate themselves in JAWS as Attorney for Plaintiff/Defendant.

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From: George Thurlow < GThurlow@rahdertlaw.com>

Sent: Thursday, February 13, 2025 10:41 AM

To: Section19 <Section19@jud6.org>; Teresa McCreary <TMcCreary@rahdertlaw.com>

Cc: John Liccione <jliccione@gmail.com>

Subject: RE: FW: Liccione v. Pinellas Democratic Executive Committee, Case No. 24-002994-CI-19

Dear Ms. McGivern:

I spoke with Mr. Liccione by telephone just now, and he advised me that he is not available for any of the times offered by the Court next week, as his election for Mayor of Gulfport is on March 11th. Mr. Liccione asked me to relay his request to the Court that this hearing be held after his election. Mr. Liccione additionally stated that if the hearing is to be set for next week or a time before his election, he would seek intervention from the Florida Supreme Court.

Assuming that the Court proceeds in holding this hearing next week, I can be available for the February 17th or 18th dates (I am in a deposition at the 2/19 times and have a hearing before Judge Andrews at the same time as the available time on 2/20).

Best,

George

George Thurlow, Esq.

Associate Attorney

Rahdert & Mortimer, PLLC

535 Central Avenue

Suite 200

St. Petersburg, FL 33701

Office: (727)823-4191 ext. 409

Fax: (727)513-5600

GThurlow@RahdertLaw.com

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CONFIDENTIAL

From: Section19 < Section19@jud6.org>
Sent: Wednesday, February 12, 2025 3:12 PM

To: Teresa McCreary < TMcCreary@rahdertlaw.com>

Cc: George Thurlow (GThurlow@rahdertlaw.com); John Liccione (Jliccione@gmail.com) **Subject:** RE: FW: Liccione v. Pinellas Democratic Executive Committee, Case No. 24-002994-CI-19

Good afternoon Teresa,

Thank you for your email and for forwarding to the court Mr. Liccione emails.

I just sent to the parties the only other time slots that I have available for this OTSC hearing.

I appreciate your assistance.

~Those affected by Hurricane Helene and/or Hurricane Milton, you are in our thoughts~

Please note Judge Ramsberger's telephone conference call number below.

Thank you,

Valerie McGivern

Judicial Assistant to

Circuit Judge Thomas Ramsberger

545 First Avenue North, Room 200

St. Petersburg, FL 33701

(727) 582-7874 / Section19@jud6.org

www.jud6.org

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by telephone conference call. *

Conference Telephone Number: 1 (425) 436-6303 Access Code: 141878#

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Please note that Florida has a very broad public records law. Most written communications to or from state officials regarding state business are considered public records. Your e-mail message may be subject to public disclosure upon request.

From: Teresa McCreary < TMcCreary@rahdertlaw.com>

Sent: Wednesday, February 12, 2025 12:23 PM

To: Section19 < Section19@jud6.org>

Cc: George Thurlow <GThurlow@rahdertlaw.com>; John Liccione <jli>jliccione@gmail.com> Subject: FW: FW: Liccione v. Pinellas Democratic Executive Committee, Case No. 24-002994-CI-19

Ms. McGivern: To supplement Mr. Thurlow's response, I am forwarding to you Mr. Liccione's response to the dates kindly and courteously provided by

the Court.

Teresa M.O. McCreary, FRP

Florida Registered Paralegal

FBN #0292645; CTM-103885

Paralegal/Legal Assistant

Phone: (727) 823-4191 X428

EFax: 7275135600@hostmyfax.com

Fax: (727) 823-6189

Email: TMcCreary@rahdertlaw.com

From: John Liccione <jliccione@gmail.com>
Sent: Wednesday, February 12, 2025 12:12 PM

To: Teresa McCreary < TMcCreary@rahdertlaw.com>; George Thurlow < GThurlow@rahdertlaw.com>

Subject: Re: FW: Liccione v. Pinellas Democratic Executive Committee, Case No. 24-002994-CI-19

Ms McCreary,

I'm not available on Feb 18th. I'd ask that we focus on dates solely beyond March 11th. This may become moot given my Petition for Emergency Writ of Prohibition/Mandamus. I'm going to be contacting the 2nd DCA to determine when I might get a ruling.

In the meantime, the following dates in March are currently blocked and unavailable:

March 12

March 13

March 14

March 21

March 25

I don't yet have anything else booked on my calendar after March 11th. All of April is currently open.

Regards,

John Liccione