EXHIBIT 4

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, IN AND FOR PINELLAS COUNTY

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TERRY GENE BOLLEA, professionally known as HULK HOGAN,

Plaintiff,

No. 12-012447-CI-011

VS.

HEATHER CLEM; GAWKER MEDIA, LLC, aka GAWKER MEDIA, et al.,

Defendants.

TELEPHONIC HEARING BEFORE THE HONORABLE JAMES CASE

DATE: January 31, 2104

TIME: 3:34 p.m. to 4:05 p.m.

PLACE: 201 East Kennedy Boulevard

Suite 712 Tampa, Florida

REPORTED BY: Susan C. Riesdorph, RPR, CRR

Notary Public, State of

Florida

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1	PROCEEDINGS
2	MR. BERLIN: This is Seth Berlin. You have
3	on the line Gregg Thomas and Susan Riesdorph, the
4	court reporter.
5	MS. SMITH: And this is Alia Smith.
6	MR. THOMAS: I'm in Ann Arbor, Michigan.
7	It's cold here.
8	MR. HARDER: Charles Harder.
9	THE COURT: This is Judge Case. How are you?
10	MR. HARDER: I'm doing well. Mr. Turkel is
11	at home sick but will be calling in.
12	THE COURT: All right.
13	(Discussion off the record.)
14	(Mr. Turkel joined the conference call.)
15	THE COURT: Welcome, Mr. Turkel. We
16	understand you are ill.
17	MR. TURKEL: I'm at home fighting through it,
18	but thank you. It was not enough that I had to
19	miss a trial in bankruptcy court, which I'm not
20	sure if that's a good thing or a bad thing.
21	THE COURT: Understood. I think we have
22	everybody. Everyone in agreement?
23	MR. HARDER: Yes, Your Honor.
24	THE COURT: Susan, for your benefit, I have
25	Seth Berlin. I have Alia Smith. I have Gregg

Thomas. And I have Charles Harder, Ken Turkel, and myself.

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That being said, Seth, this is basically your motion. I've reviewed it and also the supplemental authority that you e-mailed today. So you may go ahead.

MR. BERLIN: Understanding you have reviewed all that, Your Honor, I'll try and be brief, if I may. There's really two sets of issues in our case. The first set of issues is really primarily a legal question, which is whether Gawker's story accompanied by brief excerpts involved a matter of public concern that are protected against under the First Amendment. I think the Court has a copy of the Second DCA's opinion that spoke to that issue in the January 17th ruling, but the second issue is --

THE COURT: Yes --

MR. BERLIN: Sorry, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Yes, I did.

MR. BERLIN: Okay. Good. The central question here is, do plaintiffs factual allegations about what happened here hold up? And I talked at length about this at the October 29th hearing. I think we attached some pages from the

transcript about why there seems to be a growing body of evidence calling into question the plaintiff's version of events. And since that hearing, we've been -- continued to gather evidence. The primary reason for requesting information from the FBI relates to the second factual issue, which is whether the allegations of the complaint are true and will ultimately match the evidence. We tried to do this in a streamlined way, which was to do a formal request. I'll speak about that in a minute. The FBI's focus on this very set of events is obviously relevant as far as the plaintiff and his counsel's communications to the FBI because it speaks directly to what's their story. In this case, we've had several different stories. In this case, in our case here in state court against Gawker, the plaintiff said he didn't know about the use of cameras. He said he didn't know that he was being recorded. He said that he didn't know about this tape until Gawker posted it. says he wasn't involved in the dissemination. says this is outrageous and he's going to the FBI. He says he's going to the FBI because the defendant's actions violated two criminal

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statutes, the Video Voyeurism Act of Florida and the Florida Wiretap Act. And then in his complaint, he contends that Heather Clem was responsible for giving Gawker the tape -- and this is before Your Honor's involvement, but when the case was first filed in federal court, Gawker filed to have it removed from federal court. And the primary reason for that was allegations against Heather Clem.

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Since we filed our motion, we've learned that the plaintiff and his lawyer, not Mr. Harder or Mr. Turkel, but I think it was Mr. Houston, who is his primary personal litigation lawyer in a number of cases, attempted to press the FBI to press criminal charges against folks. And there's some suggestion that they may have done so against other people, not Heather Clem. They appeared to have done so not only in October when Gawker published its story, but about six months earlier, long before Gawker came on the scene. requested -- in discovery, we've asked for documents related to these events, and we've received absolutely nothing from the plaintiff regarding his communications with the FBI either in his production of documents or interrogatory

responses that would seek the same kind of information. Given this, we believe that his counsel -- his and his counsel's official statements to the FBI and additional facts provided to the FBI, which may not otherwise be known to Gawker but would be known to the plaintiff, go to the core issues in this case. It's for that reason that we made what is a somewhat routine request to produce -- a records You do that for medical records. request. that for other types of records. After waiting for several weeks, we finally got a response objecting, so we filed this motion. It's pretty clear that under Florida Supreme Court precedent -- we cited a case called Rojas -- the Court is authorized to require plaintiff to sign a release for records. The primary grounds for plaintiff's objection appears -- which were not stated earlier, but were in opposition to the motion -- to be that the records are shielded from disclosure by law enforcement privilege. said in the supplemental brief, or reply brief that we filed earlier, the law enforcement privilege is limited and does not apply to all facts involved in an investigation.

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perhaps even more importantly, if there is a privilege, it's not the plaintiff's privilege. It's the privilege of the FBI. It's not up to the plaintiff. He's not the one who determines whether the investigation is opened or closed. He's not the one that knows whether any confidential informants were involved and so on. If the FBI has these concerns, it can — and I think it probably will — raise those in responding to Gawker. As you can see on page 4 of his brief, any such order that Your Honor would make would not guarantee production of the documents because the FBI still may assert this privilege. So this is sort of jumping ahead on the plaintiff's part.

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Third, Hogan has alleged that Gawker may be the target of the investigation and it would be unwise for the FBI to give a target such records. I will say that in 18 months, Gawker has not in any way been contacted by the FBI or any of its employees that I know of. We have no information suggesting that the investigation is even open some 18 months later. Again, if the FBI is concerned that Gawker is nevertheless in the FBI sights and there is still an ongoing

investigation, we expect that the FBI will tell us that they can't respond to our request. And the Florida statute, I'm sure as Your Honor is familiar with, is -- there is an exemption for materials -- it's a narrow exemption -- for materials that are related to law enforcement or confidential informants and things that have to do with an ongoing criminal investigation. And if the FBI wants to assert that, it probably would.

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Lastly, the plaintiff questions whether all this information is really relevant, asserting -pure speculation are the words that were in the brief, but the FBI investigation is relevant. don't know what the FBI has in its files or what it might give us, but I think it's a fanciful suggestion to say that Hogan and his counsel complained to the FBI, are pressing the FBI to investigate under the very circumstances in this case, which is the recording and dissemination of a sex tape, to then say that they're not relevant to a lawsuit that seeks a hundred million dollars from us for the publication of the excerpts of a That seems to be -- that seems like a sex tape. hard argument to swallow.

Then lastly, I would just say -- I'll be

brief on this point because it's my hope that we would prevail on the request to get a release so the FBI, if it chooses, can release documents to us, but if for any reason the Court concludes it cannot compel the plaintiff to sign a release where the FBI will assert a privilege, then the Court should not allow the plaintiff to rely on the facts related to his FBI complaint where he's saying this is criminal and this is a violation of criminal statutes, that he's prosecuting certain people and then argue that these principles of due process preclude him from giving us the requested information or otherwise and to keep us from doing that while at the same time trying to rely on his version of those events.

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With that, unless Your Honor has any questions, I'll stop and just preserve a minute or two for rebuttal after Mr. Harder or Mr. Turkel reply.

THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Harder.

MR. HARDER: Yes, Your Honor. Thank you.

There's a threshold issue here, which is legal authority to be bringing this motion in the first place. And Gawker filed its motion to compel and then it filed a supplemental brief, and there is

not a single legal authority in either of those briefs that says that they're allowed to force -- I'm sorry. Can you hear me?

THE COURT: Yes.

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MR. HARDER: There's not a single authority in either of those briefs that says that a civil litigant can force another civil litigant to authorize access to criminal investigation documents, not a single one. It's -- there's no dispute here that the documents that are at issue are privileged. We cited to a case called "In Re: United States Department of Homeland Security." If you read that case, it goes on and on and on about all the different circuits in the United States that all say there is a law enforcement privilege where law enforcement can hold a privilege as to documents relating to its investigation. So we're dealing with privileged documents. Gawker does not cite a single legal authority that says that a Court can order a civil litigant to authorize privileged documents of any They cite to one case called Rojas. did not involve privileged documents. It involved nonprivileged medical records that were discoverable if they happened to be located in the

State of Florida, regarding a Florida litigation. Those documents happened to be in Massachusetts. Massachusetts happened to have a rule that said the person who is a patient needs to sign a waiver. And so because it was a nonprivileged document, the Court said the person had to sign a waiver. That case involved a car accident. It did not involve anything that related to law enforcement. It did not involve anything related to the Freedom of Information Act, which is what we're dealing with here, and it did not involve privileged communications.

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And then we cited a case called Franco. Ιn Franco, the Florida trial court got it wrong. it was relying on Rojas, and it said that a wife in a divorce case had to authorize access to some privileged medical records and it was citing to the Rojas case. And the party in that action took it up on a writ to the Florida District Court of Appeal, and the Florida District Court of Appeal granted the writ and vacated the order and said the difference between this case, the Franco case, and the Rojas case, is that Rojas did not involve privileged documents. Franco did involve privileged documents. And the Florida DCA

basically said there is no authority whatsoever that a court has authority to force a civil litigant to give access to privileged documents. And that's -- and that was what happened in Franco.

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So what we have here is a situation where without any legal authority whatsoever, Gawker is asking Hulk Hogan to be forced to sign a waiver as to law enforcement records. And, again, there's no legal authority that supports that. It's not — there's no legal authority cited in any of these briefs from Gawker. And we, Your Honor, have cited lots of legal authority that said these are privileged documents and there is no authority to force us to sign an acknowledgement allowing privileged documents to become discoverable in a civil action.

Gawker says in one of its briefs, the recent one, well, Hulk Hogan doesn't own the privilege and so, therefore, he can't assert the privilege. Well, it doesn't matter. We don't have to assert a privilege. There's no legal authority that says that they can force us to authorize access to privileged documents. And here's an analogy, the attorney/client privilege. I'm an attorney. I

have a client. We have communications, and that's an attorney/client communication. The client owns the privilege. The attorney doesn't. The client Well, no court can tell me, an attorney, that I have to authorize access to attorney/client communications on the basis that I'm the attorney and I don't own the privilege. It's really the No, that's not how it works. works is if there's a privileged communication, it's privileged. You can't get at it, period. And all of the legal authority that we've cited is supportive of that. Nothing in the Gawker briefs says otherwise.

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One of the purposes of a privilege is so that people can speak freely about an important issue. If you analogize to other privileges that exist, attorney/client being one, clients need to be able to talk to their lawyers freely without a chilling effect. Lawyers need to be able to talk to their clients. Other privileges like the spousal privilege, spouses need to be able to talk to each other. It's part of the institution of marriage that they communicate, so you have a privilege. You can't get at those communications. The psychotherapist/patient privilege, which was the

privilege that was at issue in the Franco case, a patient needs to be able to talk to their psychotherapist about what's going on and vice versa with the psychotherapist speaking to the patient. That privilege is this cocoon of protection so that people can speak freely. The mediation privilege, litigants should be able to freely communicate to try to settle a case so that they don't have a chilling effect and end up in litigation forever because they can't speak freely about the case.

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Law enforcement privilege, same thing. Law enforcement needs to be able to communicate freely with people about whom the investigation pertains. And by the same token, people speaking to law enforcement need to have the freedom to speak freely. If civil litigants could invade that privilege and get into it, people aren't going to talk to the police. The police aren't going to be able to get the information. Law enforcement is going to be compromised. That's why that privilege exists.

I've been practicing law for over 17 years.

I've had civil litigation after civil litigation.

I've never heard of anyone trying to get into a

criminal investigation, and I've had cases that involve criminal investigations through a civil litigation. I've never seen it. I've never heard We've scoured the law. I assume Gawker of it. has scoured the law. They haven't provided Your Honor with a single legal authority saying that this is permissible because the legal authority is that it's privileged. You can't get at it. Gawker being the moving party has the burden of proof. They have not come anywhere close to meeting the burden to prove that they're entitled to get into this privilege, and for that matter, to have a court force Hulk Hogan to sign an authorization allowing Gawker, a civil litigant, to get into these documents or to give authorization to get them.

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I'm just checking my notes here.

Gawker says we didn't identify communications on a log. Well, we're not in possession of these documents. It's law enforcement that's in possession. Gawker's trying to flip the issue on us and say, well, we need to show that these are privileged. We need to provide a privilege log. That's not how it works, not in this instance, because we're not the ones who possess the

documents. It's the FBI here. The brief -- the response brief that came in today does not address the sword and shield position, which is sword and shield does not apply to impeachment, to -- the situation is this. The sword and shield doctrine applies if a party wants to try to prove its case by introducing privileged documents but it refuses to disclose -- to produce those documents in discovery. It wants to save them until the trial. Well, the sword and shield doctrine says, no, you can't do that. If you're going to use documents at trial, you have to disclose those in discovery. Well, that is not applicable to our situation. We're not going to use anything that's in the FBI's files for purposes of our civil litigation. We don't even know what's in those files. we're certainly not going to use those. therefore, the sword and shield doctrine that would allow a preclusion order does not exist here. That's pretty much what I have, Your Honor. I'm happy to answer any questions. THE COURT: Okay. Seth? MR. BERLIN: Very well, Your Honor.

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start with the privilege question because that's

what we've heard the most about. The privilege, as I understand Mr. Harder's argument and his papers, he concedes that if the documents are not privileged, a case like Rojas, which is a Florida Supreme Court case that's been followed by a lot of other cases, it would allow Your Honor to compel him to provide a release so that we can get those records. That I think is a settled piece in Florida law.

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So the question is, does a case like Franco otherwise affect the privilege? I'm going to do that in two pieces. The first is the privilege itself. The law enforcement privilege is a narrow privilege. It does not protect every case and every piece of information that the government has about an investigation. That's not how Florida That's not how the exemptions under law works. Florida law work. So what I understand the plaintiff to be saying is because some of these documents arguably could be subject to privilege and because none of us know what they are, you can't make us give you an authorization to get any The smart thing to do is to ask, get a of them. release, go to the FBI. The FBI will tell us if these documents are or are not privileged, if

these are or are not subject to the Florida exemption or otherwise protected and we're not giving them to you. That's -- with an argument that starts with the premise that only privileged documents can be even arguably not subject to Rojas, that's what we ought to do, because we don't know whether the documents are privileged or They may say our investigation is closed and you can have all of them. I suspect that's not The FBI in my experience -- and I have likely. had experience as we represent a lot of different news media outlets, so we do periodically send requests to the FBI and to other federal agencies. They are quite adept at telling us this is something that you can't have because we object to it.

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And for what it's worth, speaking to the institutional purposes of a privilege, the other privilege is talking to your psychotherapist, talking to your priest, talking to your attorney, those are designed in a different way. The law enforcement privilege is not -- except with the exception of a confidential informant, it is very much just protecting things like, you know, law enforcement methods, confidential informants, and

the like. They'll tell us this will interfere with future investigations. And they're in a position to know that and not -- we certainly aren't. And with respect to the plaintiff, frankly neither is he or his counsel.

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The second thing is I want to speak about this Franco case, which was a case in which -what happened there -- it did involve the psychotherapist privilege. What happened there is the psychotherapist was sent a subpoena and sent back an objection. All right? And the -- part of the objection said, we can't release these without -- we think they're confidential and we can't release the records without a release from the patient in any event. Then the other side, the husband, went to court and said, okay, I want a release. And what the District Court of Appeals was objecting to was the fact that the court ordered -- the trial court had ordered the release signed without addressing the privilege issue that had been raised by the psychotherapist.

If this was a case where we had sent the subpoena to the FBI and they objected where they would have had to produce the records if there was a release, which is not true of the FBI as it is

with a psychotherapist, then, you know, Your Honor would have before you the privilege issue, but that's not before you in the way that it was before the trial court in Franco. And what the court in Franco is essentially saying is that where this privilege has been properly asserted by the psychotherapist, you had to address that before you could order a records release.

This is a different situation obviously.

First of all, the FBI hasn't objected because there's been -- we haven't submitted a release yet. And, second, even if we do submit a release, the FBI is not obliged in the way a doctor's office would be or a psychotherapist's office would be to release records. It operates completely differently.

So the concerns that were annotated in the Franco case, which recognize that Rojas was settled law but just thought it didn't apply in that unique set of circumstances, don't really apply here.

So having talked about the privilege issues,

I do think that, you know -- we cited a Florida

Supreme Court authority on this, and the only

argument in response is, you can't get any

documents which are privileged, which begs the question, are these documents privileged or not? We don't know. And since we don't know, you ought to be able to get a release and preserve for some other day the privilege issue. But if there is one, the FBI will assert it.

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And the -- excuse me. The fact of the matter is that the plaintiff and his lawyer know what The plaintiff and his they sent to the FBI. lawyer probably kept a copy of any documents they submitted to the FBI. We have asked for those things. We have not gotten them. And so to simply say this is something that is not privileged because they didn't claim a privilege, it is raising the additional specter that the information that's being sent to the FBI is different than the information that's being sent to this Court, and that's something that we, in a matter of fairness to us, need to be able to get to the bottom of. We should not be asked to defend this litigation, at the end of which we're asked to pay a hundred million dollars, but that's what's gone on. That's why we're asking for this release and, again, reserving for another day the question of whether there is a privilege that the

FBI may assert and what records it may apply to.
And really that's where we are.

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In terms of the preclusion order, because we have, I think, explained -- and I won't rehearse this again, Your Honor, but because we have explained, I think in a fair bit of detail, why it is that the statements to the FBI are the core -the case's core of the public statements, the public narrative that the plaintiff engaged in over and over again was, you know, if you don't do this, you better watch out because I'm pursuing criminal charges. My lawyer and I are meeting with the FBI, etcetera, etcetera, Those are all things that are part -- a etcetera. central part of the narrative that the plaintiff is telling about what happened here, which we've called into serious question. It can't be that he can get up and testify that that's what he did and then we can't even find out -- we don't even know if he did that. Maybe he didn't do that at all. I don't think that's true, because I think if that were true, they would have come and said this motion is unnecessary because we didn't initiate an FBI investigation. But we can't have a situation where we go to a trial and the plaintiff

is allowed to get up and say all those things and we can't even get information, some of which may not be the subject of any privilege and would be disclosable if we get a release from him. I think with that, unless the Court has any questions, I think I'll stop.

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THE COURT: I don't think so. You all have done an excellent job of outlining the issues. have, again, reviewed the motion. And having considered the oral argument that has been presented here today, as the general master that's been appointed in this case, it is my recommendation and my finding that Gawker has made a sufficient basis for the granting of the motion to compel for the authorization. And it would be my recommendation to the judge in this case that an order be constructed directing Mr. Hogan to provide the authorization. And I'm -- so that perhaps we can get the information if it's available within the time before these depositions, I'm going to suggest that three days ought to be allowed.

THE COURT REPORTER: I'm sorry, Judge. Three days?

THE COURT: Three days, yes, ma'am.

1 MR. HARDER: Your Honor, may I ask a point of 2 clarification? I apologize for not having covered 3 this with Mr. Thomas in advance. But as you know, 4 I'm not from Florida and a little bit less 5 familiar with the intricacies of the Florida 6 procedure. How does that work with you as a 7 special discovery magistrate in terms of actually 8 turning this into an order? What exactly 9 procedurally happens, if I might ask? 10 THE COURT: Gregg can probably tell you, but 11 what would happen from here is that you and Gregg 12 would create a report and recommendation from the 13 general master for me to sign to the judge 14 together with a proposed order for the judge to 1.5 sign consistent with what I have recommended, not 16 unlike what you might find in the federal 17 magistrate system. 18 MR. HARDER: Very well. Understood. 19 do that. 20 THE COURT: Thank you all very much. Okay. 21 I appreciate it. 22 Thank you, Your Honor. MR. BERLIN: 23 MR. THOMAS: Thank you, Judge. 24 (Proceedings concluded at 4:05 p.m.) 25

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1	REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
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3	STATE OF FLORIDA :
4	COUNTY OF HILLSBOROUGH :
5	
6	I, Susan C. Riesdorph, RPR, CRR certify that I
7 8	was authorized to and did stenographically report the foregoing proceedings and that the transcript is a true and complete record of my stenographic notes.
9	I further certify that I am not a relative,
10	employee, attorney, or counsel of any of the parties, nor am I a relative or employee of any of the parties'
11	attorney or counsel connected with the action, nor am I financially interested in the outcome of the foregoing
12	action.
13	Dated this 12th day of February, 2014, IN THE CITY OF TAMPA, COUNTY OF HILLSBOROUGH, STATE OF
14	FLORIDA.
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17	Susan C. Riesdorph, RPR, CRR, CLSP
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